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ABSTRACT 
SENSOR INTRUSION DETECTION IN CONTROL SYSTEMS USING 
ESTIMATION THEORY 
 
 
Jiayi Su, B.S. 
 
Marquette University, 2018 
 
 
In this thesis, two different approaches to sensor intrusion detection are presented. 
In the first approach, an estimation algorithm using a bank of Kalman Filters is designed 
that is capable of estimating the intrusion signal when sensors are affected in control 
systems. The mathematical models of the control system will be estabilished and the system 
measurement will be shown and after that, various false signals, such as constant-type and 
ramp-type signal, will be selected as the intrusion signal to affect the system output 
mentioned above. The system measurement will be tested based on a bank of Kalman 
Filters. The probabilities of each intrusion state (affected and unaffected) of the control 
system will be calculated as a function of time. The estimation of the states from a bank of 
Kalman Filters together with the associated probabilities will determine whether the sensor 
is under attack or not by using the information from the estimation algorithm. The 
performance of the algorithm will be tested based on the various levels of the system and 
measurement noise. 
 
In the second approach, a new estimation algorithm is applied to detect the intrusion 
signal targeting the system mentioned above. By calculating the sample mean value of the 
system state and measurement in time, the changes of the system measurement can be 
detected by calculating the residual between the actual value and the theoretical sample 
mean value of the system measurement and in that case, the intrusion signal can be found. 
Thesis conclusions, summary and future work is also mentioned in the last chapter of this 
work. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Sensors are a critical part of feedback control systems, but they are volunerable to 
attacks in cyber-physical systems. Such attacks may cause significant damage to 
industrial control systems and this gives attackers a lot of chance to affect this important 
element. Thus, detection and protection against attack signals become a significant work 
to guarantee the proper operation of such systems. Estimation theory has been proposed 
for many years and, as one can expect, many researchers have expanded on it. One 
specific researcher, R.E. Kalman, came up with an approach to describe the discrete-data 
linear filtering problem [1]. The technique he developed could be the way to estimate 
system states and minimize system’s disturbance and noise, which could be a great tool 
of detecting sensor intrusions. The development of the detection algorithm in this thesis 
utilizes this method. To begin, it is important to have a general background to understand 
how sensor intrusion happens and how to use this algorithm as a tool to make the 
detection be possible.  
 
1.1 Sensor Intrusion 
 
Sensors play an important role for measuring system states while also being 
vulnerable and sometimes exposed on an external environment, which makes it easy to be 
attacked. Therefore, the number of sensor intrusions has increased significantly with the 
development of the process control system. Sometimes sensor intrusion happens because 
the system operates under a harsh environment, like being exposed to extremely cold 
weather or to the sun for a long time, which makes the sensor unable to detect the correct 
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system measurement signal.  Usually, intruders hack into the sensor, replace the system 
measurement with a false signal, which leads to a terrible result for the industrial process 
and may cause a malfunction or permanent damage to its constituents.  
 
There are various types of sensor attacks that could influence system’s 
performance, such as surge attacks, bias attacks and geometric attacks. Surge attacks 
allow intruders to achieve their maximum damage as soon as possible when they have 
access to the system. Bias attacks let attackers change the system output by adding a 
small disturbance over a large period of time. While geometric attacks let attackers try to 
switch the state of the system at the beginning of the attack and then maximize the 
damage after the system has been moved to a more vulnerable state [2].  
 
A good example of intrusion targeting a control system is the Maroochy Shire 
Council’s sewage control system in Queensland, Australia [3]. A hacker used a laptop 
and a radio transmitter to take control of 150 sewage pumping stations. Over a three-
month period, he released one million liters of untreated sewage into a storm water drain 
from where it flowed into local waterways. The attack was motivated by revenge on the 
part of the hacker after he failed to secure a job with the Maroochy Shire Council. 
Unfortunately, ways to detect those attacks are still limited because attack signals are 
always hidden, which increases the difficulties of detection and observation of sensors 
intrusion, and there are some techniques that show it is impossible to estimate sensor and 
actuator intrusions under certain conditions [4]. 
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Fortunately, estimation theory is widely applied for detecting and estimating 
system output and state, which makes it easier to develop a method of observing the 
attack signal.  
 
1.2 Estimation Theory 
 
Estimation theory is a branch of statistics that deals with estimating the values of 
parameters based on measured empirical data that has a random component. The 
estimation process could be done by using an estimator and historical data or 
measurements to observe unknown parameters in real applications [5]. Usually, there are 
three topics discussed under estimation theory, including smoothing, filtering and 
prediction. Smoothing is a method of estimating the unknown historical parameters by 
using current measurements. Filtering is a method of estimating the current unknown 
parameters by using known measurements and prediction, which is a way of estimating 
the future unknown parameters by using current measurements [6]. Problems with these 
three branches could be approached by using different estimation methods, such as 
Kalman Filter and its various derivatives, Particle Filter, Markov chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC), Cramer-Rao Bound, Bayes estimators, Wiener Filter and Maximum likelihood 
estimators.  Also, a huge number of applications of estimation theory using the methods 
mentioned above have been used in different technical areas as shown in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1: Applications of estimation theory [7]. 
Area of applications Examples 
Control Systems Estimate the position of a powerboat for 
correcting navigation in the presence of sensor 
and environmental noise. 
Communications Estimate the carrier frequency of a signal for 
demodulation to the baseband in the presence of 
degradation noise. 
Seismology Estimate the underground distance of an oil 
deposit based on the different densities of oil and 
rock layers. 
Biomedical Estimate the heart rate of a fetus in the presence 
of environmental noise. 
Image Processing Estimate the position and orientation of an object 
from a camera image in the presence of lighting 
and background noise. 
Radar Communications Estimate the delay of the received pulse echo in 
the presence of noise. 
Speech Signal Processing Estimate the parameters of the speech model in 
the presence of speech/speaker variability and 
environmental noise. 
Sensor Fault Detection Estimate the sensor fault of the industrial control 
system in the presence of noise. 
 
In this thesis, estimation theory will be used to solve the sensor intrusion problem 
and, the Kalman filter bank will be introduced and applied as the main estimation 
algorithm for the topic disused in chapter 2 and 4. 
 
1.3 Previous Work Involving the Use of Estimation Theory 
 
In 1978, R. N. Clark introduced a method of detecting incipient instrument fault 
[8]. The dedicated observer scheme (DOS) he introduced could be applied for estimating 
the lateral axis control system of a hydrofoil boat. He used several observers where each 
observer was designed for each sensor, and each observer could only receive its input 
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signal from the paired sensors. Also, the plant input could be received from all observers. 
In this case, the incipient fault could be detected if there is a fault input signal from a 
certain sensor while the other estimated signal will remain identical. The logic unit he 
used to make the decision of which sensor is affected is to set up a threshold value for 
each instrument and the false alarm will not be triggered if the residual of each 
instrument is less than the threshold value, otherwise the fault could be found and known 
by using this unit.  
 
In 2003, T. Kobayashi and D. L. Simon introduced the application of a bank of 
Kalman filters for aircraft engine fault diagnostics [9]. They used multiple Kalman filters 
where each Kalman filter is designed for a specific sensor fault. When a fault comes 
through the sensor, all filters expect the one using a hypothesis similar to the faulty signal 
will show large errors, which could detect the unique sensor fault. Comparing to R. N. 
Clark’s work, T. Kobayashi and D. L. Simon were calculating the weighted sum of 
squared residual (WSSR) for each filter and use WSSRs to compare with their pre-
established thresholds. When a sensor is affected, every WSSRs expect the affected one 
will go beyond their thresholds, which means the affected one is found successfully based 
on their WSSR decision unit. 
 
 Similarly, W. Xue, Y. Guo and X. Dong applied the Kalman Filter bank as the main 
estimation algorithm to detect aircraft engine sensor and actuator intrusion in 2007 [10]. 
The basic logic of their fault detection and isolation is firstly calculate the residual value 
between low-pressure spool speed from sensors and estimated low-pressure spool speed 
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from observer measurements and, the second step is to compare the residuals with 
thresholds and as mentioned, all filters except the one using the correct hypothesis will 
produce large estimation errors, which could let the fault signal be isolated. 
 
In 2011, D. H. Trinh and H. Chafouk applied the Kalman Filter bank technique to 
detect the intrusion signals in a wind turbine generator system [11].  The difference 
between the previous work is that they used a different decision unit to isolate the 
affected signal. A threshold was set firstly based on the estimated values and residuals, 
and then the Page-Hinkley’s test was applied for the fault signal isolation. They claimed 
that using Page-Hinkley’s test for the fault assessment is because its simplicity and it only 
needs low computational power. 
 
    In 2017, G. Rigatos, D. Serpanos and N. Zervos implemented the same 
technique on the power grid sensors fault detection [12]. After estimating systems states, 
calculating residuals and setting up thresholds for each sensor, they applied the 𝜒2 tests to 
isolate the fault signal. The results of the detection of the intrusion signal could be found 
by using 𝜒2 tests, and the highest scores of the 𝜒2 tests could show the compromised 
sensor.  
 
In 2017, M. Rezaee, N. S-Nokhodberiz and J. Poshtan developed a method of 
using the Kalman Filter to detect and identify the sensor fault in an electro-pump system 
[13]. Similarly, as mentioned before, they calculated the estimated states and 
measurements of the electro-pump system and after that, they calculated the root mean 
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square error (RMSE) comparing to the system state and measurement. By setting up an 
upper bound of the RMSE, they could find if there’s an intrusion signal in the electro-
pump system.  
 
 In 2018, Y. Chen, S. Kar and J. M. F. Moura use the optimal attack strategy to 
attack the sensor and the controller they built in order to learn how a hacker could design 
an intrusion signal so that the attack signal could cause the maximum damage [14]. After 
knowing the optimal attack signal based on the system model, they also designed an 
estimation method, which use 𝜒2 tests to isolate the fault signal. 
 
 
1.4 Scope of This Work and Main Contributions 
 
This thesis proposes to develop a method to detect sensor intrusions in first-order 
and second-order discrete-time system that have disturbances both in the systems state 
and output. The distribution of the disturbances is proposed Gaussian and the intrusion 
signal is firstly proposed a constant-type and then a step and ramp-type on both first-
order and second-order system outputs. A bank of Kalman Filters will be the main 
algorithm of estimating system state and output, which provides the basis for information 
available to know if the system is affected or not [19].  Mathematical models of control 
system will be established and various false signals, such as constant and ramp signal, 
will be selected and tested based on a bank of Kalman Filter. The probabilities of each 
state (affected/unaffected) of the control system will be calculated as a function of time. 
8 
 
 
 
The estimation of the states from a bank of Kalman Filters together with the associated 
probabilities will determine whether the sensor is under attack or not by using the data 
from the estimation algorithm. The performance of the algorithm will be tested based on 
the various levels of the system and measurement noise. 
 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
 
This thesis is comprised of five chapters. Chapter 2 consists of an introduction 
and derivation of the Kalman Filter and bank of Kalman Filters that have been proposed. 
Chapter 3 consists of system modes with attack signals. The mathematical models for the 
first-order and second-order discrete time systems with system and measurement noise 
will be established and both the systems will be affected with constant-type and ramp-
type attack signal. Chapter 4 discusses the implementation of a bank of Kalman Filters 
both on the first and second order systems with different attack signals. The performance 
of the algorithm will then be tested based on the various levels of the system and 
measurement noise. Chapter 5 is a summary of the previous chapters and suggestions for 
future work. 
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2 A REVIEW OF ESTIMATION THEORY AND INTRODUCTION OF 
KALMAN FILTER 
 
2.1 Introduction: Development of the Estimation Theory and Kalman Filter 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, estimation theory is a branch of statistics that deals 
with estimating values of the states of a system based on measured empirical data that has 
a random component. By using an estimator with historical data or measurements, the 
estimation process could be used to estimate values of unknown parameters in real 
applications as introduced in Chapter 1 [5]. 
 
With the growth of computational power, it is easier to use an observer to 
estimate system states with a lot of measurement data. The Kalman filter (KF), as one of 
the estimation algorithms, is developed to estimate system states and measurements in a 
lot of fields. In this thesis, the sensor intrusion problem could be solved by using Kalman 
Filter and one of its extensions, a bank of Kalman filter (BKF), to detect the changes of 
the systems measurements and find the intrusion when there is an attack signal enters the 
system and replaces the system measurement. Both the Kalman filter and a bank of 
Kalman filters (KF and BKF) will be introduced and derived in this thesis and the 
algorithms for applying these estimation methods into the sensor intrusion problems will 
be shown. Some of the typical applications in different areas will also be given in section 
2.2  
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In fact, most of these modern estimation-theory-based techniques can be found at 
the heart of many electronic signal processing systems designed to extract information 
[16]. Typical application areas and example applications in areas utilizing estimation 
theory are listed in Table 2.1 [18]. 
 
2.2 Kalman Filter 
 
The Kalman filter, also known as linear quadratic estimation (LQE), is a method 
of estimating the unknown parameters and states of a system with statistical noise. It can 
produce the estimated values of unknown variables and can also minimizes the mean of 
the error. There are a huge amont of applications of using Kalman Filter in many 
different areas, such as tracking problems, navigation problems, signal processing 
problems and even in economics. Moreover, the Kalman filter is also a main topic in 
robotic motion, where its used to optimize the trajectory of the motions.  At the same 
time, as one the estimation algorithms, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the Kalman filter 
could be used to estimate not only the present state by giving the known measurements, 
but the past and the future states of a system by some changes to the filter.  
 
Basically, the Kalman filter works with two steps, the first step is called 
prediction step or time update step, where it could produce the current state estimate 
together with its associated noise value [15]. The second step is called measurement 
update step or correct step, where the measurement could be updated using a weighted 
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average, which could minimize the uncertainty of the measurement. Figure 2.1 shows the 
process of the two steps below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Process of the two steps of the Kalman Filter [15] 
 
 
The Kalman filter is used to reduce the noise in systems states and outputs in 
numerous applications and the noise is assumed Gaussian on most of the applications. 
The Kalman filter can also work if the noise disturbance is not Gaussian.  
  
The Kalman filter is named after R.E. Kalman, one of the primary developers of 
its theory. In 1960, R.E. Kalman first developed a method of a recursive algorithm to deal 
with the discrete-time linear filtering problem [1,16]. The recursive algorithm means the 
estimated value ?̂?𝑘+1 can be calculated by using the previous estimated value ?̂?𝑘. Later 
on, the development of various extensions on the Kalman filter have been derived 
targeting different kinds of problems and applications, especially for systems within the 
security field. Nowadays it has been widely applied in engineering problems, 
mathematical problems, biomedical problems and even economic problems, and most of 
Measurement Update 
(“Correct”) 
Time Update  
(“Predict”) 
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the problems can be solved properly because of this technique. In some of the 
applications, Kalman filter is a crucial technique and one cannot solve it without using 
this technique. Some typical examples of applications by using Kalman filter are 
introduced in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.1: Typical applications of various forms of Kalman filter [18]. 
Area of applications Examples  
Navigation To control and assist the navigation of 
automobiles, aircraft or spacecraft using the 
measured sensor data in the environment 
with noise and disturbance [21]. 
Image processing Using various forms of Kalman filter to 
estimate the position and orientation of an 
object from a camera image in the presence of 
lighting and background noise. 
Radar communications Estimating the distance/velocity of the target 
object by various forms of the Kalman filter. 
Control system Active noise control in control systems [15]. 
Economics Parameter estimation of linear or non-linear 
econometric models [22]. 
Speech signal processing To estimate the parameters of the speech 
model and to get rid of the noise out of the 
speech signal. 
Forecasting Estimating the parameters of the forecasting 
model using the historical data. 
Sensor Fault Detection To estimate the sensor fault of the industrial 
control system in the presence of noise. 
 
2.2.1 Derivation of Kalman Filter 
 
Consider a linear discrete-time stochastic system with system states 𝑥𝑘 ∈ ℝ
𝑛, 
system measurements 𝑦𝑘 ∈ ℝ
𝑝, system inputs  𝑢𝑘 ∈ ℝ
𝑚 and system matrices 𝐴𝑘, 𝐵𝑘, 𝐶𝑘 
and 𝐷𝑘, where 𝐴𝑘, 𝐵𝑘, 𝐶𝑘 and 𝐷𝑘 are all time-varying matrices, 
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𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘𝑢𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘𝑣𝑘 (2.1𝑎) 
 
𝑦𝑘 = 𝐶𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘𝑢𝑘 + 𝐺𝑘𝑤𝑘 (2.1𝑏) 
 
in (2.1a), 𝑣𝑘 is the system state noise, where the covariance of the noise is 𝑉𝑘, and  𝑤𝑘 is 
the system measurement noise, where the covariance of the noise is 𝑊𝑘 .  𝑆𝑘 is the cross 
covariance, where it is between the covariance of the state noise 𝑉𝑘 and the covariance of 
the measurement 𝑊𝑘.  The system state noise vector 𝑣𝑘, system measurement noise 
vector 𝑤𝑘 and the initial state value of the system 𝑥0 can be expressed with arbitrary 
densities below, 
 
[
𝑥0
𝑣𝑘
𝑤𝑘
] ~ ([
?̅?0
0
0
] , [
𝑋0 0 0
0 𝑉𝑘 𝑆𝑘
0 𝑆𝑘
𝑇 𝑊𝑘
])  
 
In this thesis, the sensor intrusion detection problem, 𝑥𝑘 represent the system 
states, where it needs to be observed by Kalman filter, and 𝑦𝑘 is the system outputs. 
Suppose 𝑢𝑘 represents the unit step input of the system, then the system estimated states 
𝑥𝑘 could be known by using a Kalman filter with the system outputs as long as the 
system is observable. 
 
Before deriving the Kalman filter, it is necessary to assume an observer that could 
estimate the system state at time 𝑘 + 1, where the estimated state should be ?̂?𝑘+1. After 
assuming an observer, some other information at time 𝑘, will also be needed to derive the 
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Kalman filter. The first information will be the present estimate states ?̂?𝑘, also the current 
input 𝑢𝑘 and the current system outputs 𝑦𝑘 should be available. After knowing these three 
pieces of information, an observer could be given in (2.2). 
 
?̂?𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘?̂?𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘𝑢𝑘 + 𝐾𝑘(𝑦𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘) (2.2) 
 
where ?̂?𝑘 is the estimate of the system output given by (2.3), 
 
?̂?𝑘 = 𝐶𝑘?̂?𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘𝑢𝑘 (2.3) 
    
𝐾𝑘 is the Kalman gain, which minimizes the variances of the error, and the error is defined 
as the residual of the true state and the estimated state, which is given by (2.4) 
 
𝑒𝑘+1 = 𝑥𝑘+1 − ?̂?𝑘+1 (2.4) 
 
The estimated value of the unknown states is unbiased (i.e. 𝐸{𝑒𝑘+1} = 0 ). The error 
covariance, which is defined as 𝑃𝑘+1 = 𝐸{(𝑒𝑘+1)(𝑒𝑘+1)
𝑇}, needs to be found before 
getting the Kalman gain, 𝐾𝑘. While from the definition of the error covariance, some 
relationship between system states, system matrices and error covariance could be found.  
 
First, substitute (2.1b) and (2.3) into (2.2), resulting in the estimated state ?̂?𝑘+1 
expressed below, 
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?̂?𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘?̂?𝑘 +  𝐵𝑘𝑢𝑘 + 𝐾𝑘[(𝐶𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘𝑢𝑘 + 𝐺𝑘𝑤𝑘) − (𝐶𝑘?̂?𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘𝑢𝑘)] (2.5𝑎) 
 
Next, the error between the true state 𝑥𝑘+1 and estimated state  ?̂?𝑘+1 can be 
expressed by submitting (2.1a) and (2.5a), 
 
𝑒𝑘+1 = {𝐴𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘𝑢𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘𝑣𝑘} −  
{𝐴𝑘?̂?𝑘 +  𝐵𝑘𝑢𝑘 + 𝐾𝑘[(𝐶𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘𝑢𝑘 + 𝐺𝑘𝑤𝑘) − (𝐶𝑘?̂?𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘𝑢𝑘)]} (2.5𝑏) 
 
After some transformation, (2.5b) can be shown as (2.5), 
 
𝑒𝑘+1 = (𝐴𝑘 − 𝐾𝑘𝐶𝑘)𝑒𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘𝑣𝑘 − 𝐾𝑘𝐺𝑘𝑤𝑘 (2.6) 
     
Substituting (2.5) into the definition of the error covariance yields  
 
𝑃𝑘+1 = 𝐸{[(𝐴𝑘 − 𝐾𝑘𝐶𝑘)𝑒𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘𝑣𝑘 − 𝐾𝑘𝐺𝑘𝑤𝑘] 
[(𝐴𝑘 − 𝐾𝑘𝐶𝑘)𝑒𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘𝑣𝑘 − 𝐾𝑘𝐺𝑘𝑤𝑘]
𝑇} (2.7) 
 
 
After some transformation on (2.7), the error covariance equation can be found as  
 
𝑃𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐴𝑘
𝑇 − 𝐴𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐶𝑘
𝑇𝐾𝑘
𝑇 − 𝐾𝑘𝐶𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐴𝑘
𝑇 + 𝐾𝑘𝐶𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐶𝑘
𝑇𝐾𝑘
𝑇 + 𝐹𝑘𝑉𝑘𝐹𝑘
𝑇 
− 𝐾𝑘𝐺𝑘𝑆𝑘
𝑇𝐹𝑘
𝑇 − 𝐹𝑘𝑆𝑘𝐺𝑘
𝑇𝐾𝑘
𝑇 + 𝐾𝑘𝐺𝑘𝑊𝑘𝐺𝑘
𝑇𝐾𝑘
𝑇 (2.8)
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After finding the error covariance equation, it is possible to derive the Kalman gain, 𝐾𝑘. 
During the process of deriving the error covariance 𝑃𝑘+1, there is an important property 
that needs to be noticed and that is 𝑃𝑘+1 is a symmetric posite definite matrix. Thus, by 
using this property, one can minimize the error covariance to find the Kalman gain 𝐾𝑘, 
and this could be transformed to minimize the trace (𝑇𝑟{𝑃𝑘+1}) of the error covariance 
matrix 𝑃𝑘+1. Therefore, there is a way of getting Kalman gain by taking the partial 
derivative of the trace of the error covariance 𝑇𝑟{𝑃𝑘+1} with respect to 𝐾𝑘. After taking 
the partial derivative of 𝑇𝑟{𝑃𝑘+1}, one can let the partial derivative equation equal zero to 
get the expression of the Kalman gain 𝐾𝑘. [17] The equation of the partial derivative of 
the trace of the error covariance 𝑇𝑟{𝑃𝑘+1} can be expressed as (2.9), 
 
𝛿 𝑇𝑟{𝑃𝑘+1}
𝛿 𝐾𝑘
= −2𝐴𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐶𝑘
𝑇 −  2𝐹𝑘𝑆𝑘𝐺𝑘
𝑇 +  2𝐾𝑘(𝐶𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐶𝑘
𝑇 + 𝐺𝑘𝑊𝑘𝐺𝑘
𝑇) (2.9) 
 
Setting the partial derivative equation (2.9) equal to zero, the Kalman gain could be found 
as below,  
 
𝐾𝑘 = (𝐴𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐶𝑘
𝑇 + 𝐹𝑘𝑆𝑘𝐺𝑘
𝑇)(𝐶𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐶𝑘
𝑇 + 𝐺𝑘𝑊𝑘𝐺𝑘
𝑇)−1 (2.10) 
 
As mentioned previously, the Kalman gain minimizes the error covariance in time, so the 
error covariance equation (2.8) is simplified after substituting (2.10) into it. Then the 
error covariance could be expressed as  
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𝑃𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐴𝑘
𝑇  +  𝐹𝑘𝑉𝑘𝐹𝑘
𝑇 − (𝐴𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐶𝑘
𝑇 + 𝐹𝑘𝑆𝑘𝐺𝑘
𝑇)(𝐶𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐶𝑘
𝑇 + 𝐺𝑘𝑊𝑘𝐺𝑘
𝑇)−1 
(𝐶𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐴𝑘
𝑇 + 𝐺𝑘𝑆𝑘
𝑇𝐹𝑘
𝑇) (2.11) 
    
If the system state noise and system measurement noise are white noise, which is the 
most commonlt the case for most of the system, including the system considered in this 
thesis, then their values will be uncorrelated with each other [18] and because the system 
state noise and system measurement noise are uncorrelated with each other, the cross-
covariance, 𝑆𝑘, will be zero, then the system state noise vector 𝑣𝑘, system measurement 
noise vector 𝑤𝑘 and the initial state value of the system 𝑥0 are independent white random 
variables with arbitrary densities, which could be expressed as below [19]:  
  
[
𝑥0
𝑣𝑘
𝑤𝑘
] ~ ([
?̅?0
0
0
] , [
𝑋0 0 0
0 𝑉𝑘 0
0 0 𝑊𝑘
]) (2.12) 
 
The expression of the Kalman gain 𝐾𝑘 and the error covariance 𝑃𝑘+1 can be then 
simplified as (2.13) and (2.14) if the cross-covariance 𝑆𝑘 = 0, 
 
𝐾𝑘 = 𝐴𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐶𝑘
𝑇  (𝐶𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐶𝑘
𝑇 + 𝐺𝑘𝑊𝑘𝐺𝑘
𝑇)−1 (2.13) 
 
𝑃𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐴𝑘
𝑇  +  𝐹𝑘𝑉𝑘𝐹𝑘
𝑇 − 𝐴𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐶𝑘
𝑇 (𝐶𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐶𝑘
𝑇 + 𝐺𝑘𝑊𝑘𝐺𝑘
𝑇)−1(𝐶𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐴𝑘
𝑇) (2.14) 
 
After finding the expression of the Kalman gain and the error covariance, the state update 
equation can be shown as (2.15), 
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?̂?𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘?̂?𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘𝑢𝑘 + 𝐾𝑘?̃?𝑘 (2.15) 
 
Where ?̃?𝑘 is the innovation term, which is the difference between the system output 𝑦𝑘 
and the estimated output ?̂?𝑘 at each time 𝑘 and it could be shown below 
 
?̃?𝑘 = 𝑦𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘 
= 𝑦𝑘 − (𝐶?̂?𝑘 + 𝐷𝑢𝑘) (2.16) 
 
From (2.13), (2.14) and (2.15), the recursive algorithm to calculate the system state 
estimate is designed. This algorithm works recursively according to the measurement 
state at every time step 𝑘 and, because of its recursive nature, the only information that 
the Kalman filter needs to know are the current estimate states ?̂?𝑘, the input 𝑢𝑘 and the 
measurement states 𝑦𝑘 for calculating the updated estimated value ?̂?𝑘+1. The advantage 
of this recursive algorithm is that there is no need to store the past measurements because 
it only requires the last “best guess” to do the estimation rather than the entire historical 
data.  
 
2.2.2 Kalman Filter Algorithm 
 
As mentioned previously, the Kalman filter is a recursive estimation algorithm, 
where it only needs the latest estimate of the states and the measurement states to 
calculate the updated state estimate. After deriving the Kalman filter, an introduction will 
be shown on how this recursive algorithm works.    
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When implementing the Kalman filter algorithm, it is necessary to make sure the 
systems matrices 𝐴𝑘, 𝐵𝑘, 𝐶𝑘 and 𝐷𝑘 are known and, the value of the measurement noise 
covariance 𝑊𝑘 and the value of state noise covariance 𝑉𝑘 are available. After making sure 
the systems matrices, the measurement noise covariance and the state noise covariance 
are all available, the next step is to assume the value of initial systems state estimate ?̂?0 
and the initial error covariance 𝑃0. Basically, ?̂?0 and 𝑃0 needs to be set up based on the 
situation. For example, if the system’s uncertainty is extremely high, then the initial error 
covariance 𝑃0 needs to be set up at a relatively high value, so that the Kalman filter could 
work “harder” to decrease the uncertainty of the system [1,18]. Also, the initial state 
estimate ?̂?0 needs to be set up within a reasonable range so that the Kalman filter could 
work properly.  Once ?̂?0 and 𝑃0 are set up, the next step is to find the Kalman gain 𝐾0 
where it could be found by using (2.13). After finding the Kalman gain 𝐾0, the state 
estimate ?̂?1 and the error covariance 𝑃1 could be updated with the associated system 
measurement 𝑦0 by using (2.14) and (2.15). It could be noticed that the process above 
happens at time 𝑘 = 0. The updated ?̂?1 and  𝑃1 could be used as the initial value at time 
𝑘 = 1 to calculate the new Kalman gain 𝐾1, after finding the new gain, repeat the process 
again until the error covariance 𝑃𝑘 becomes small or the measurement is taken at time 𝑘 
[18]. This process could be shown as Fig 2.2 below.  
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Setting up the initial state 
estimate ?̂?𝟎  
𝑥0 = 𝐸{𝑥0} 
 
Setting up the initial error 
covariance 𝐏𝟎 
𝑃0 = 𝐸{(𝑥0 − 𝑥0)(𝑥0 − 𝑥0)
𝑇} 
 
Calculate Kalman gain 
𝐾0 = 𝐴0𝑃0𝐶0
𝑇 (𝐶0𝑃0𝐶0
𝑇 + 𝐺0𝑊0𝐺0
𝑇)−1 
Update state estimate 
𝑥1 = 𝐴0?̂?0 + 𝐵0𝑢0 + 𝐾0(𝑦0
− [𝐶0?̂?0
+ 𝐷0𝑢0]) 
 
Update the error covariance 
𝑃1 = 𝐴0𝑃0𝐴0
𝑇  + 𝐹0𝑉0𝐹0
𝑇
− 𝐴0𝑃0𝐶0
𝑇 (𝐶0𝑃0𝐶0
𝑇
+ 𝐺0𝑊0𝐺0
𝑇)−1(𝐶0𝑃0𝐴0
𝑇) 
 
 𝑦0 
 
Calculate Kalman gain 
𝐾1 = 𝐴1𝑃1𝐶1
𝑇 (𝐶1𝑃1𝐶1
𝑇 + 𝐺1𝑊1𝐺1
𝑇)−1 
 
Update state estimate 
𝑥2 = 𝐴1?̂?1 + 𝐵1𝑢1 + 𝐾1(𝑦1 − [𝐶1?̂?1
+ 𝐷1𝑢1]) 
 
Update the error covariance 
𝑃2 = 𝐴1𝑃1𝐴1
𝑇  + 𝐹1𝑉1𝐹1
𝑇
− 𝐴1𝑃1𝐶1
𝑇 (𝐶1𝑃1𝐶1
𝑇
+ 𝐺1𝑊1𝐺1
𝑇)−1(𝐶1𝑃1𝐴1
𝑇) 
𝑦1 
 
Calculate Kalman gain 
𝐾𝑘 = 𝐴𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐶𝑘
𝑇 (𝐶𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐶𝑘
𝑇 + 𝐺𝑘𝑊𝑘𝐺𝑘
𝑇)−1 
 
Update state estimate 
𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘𝑢𝑘 + 𝐾𝑘(𝑦𝑘
− [𝐶𝑘𝑥𝑘
+ 𝐷𝑘𝑢𝑘]) 
Update the error covariance 
𝑃𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐴𝑘
𝑇  + 𝐹𝑘𝑉𝑘𝐹𝑘
𝑇
− 𝐴𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐶𝑘
𝑇 (𝐶𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐶𝑘
𝑇
+ 𝐺𝑘𝑊𝑘𝐺𝑘
𝑇)−1(𝐶𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐴𝑘
𝑇) 
 𝑦𝑘 
 
………
…… 
………
…… 
………
…… 
k = 0 
k = 1 
After updating 
k times 
Figure 2.2: Flowchart of Kalman filter algorithm 
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2.3 A Bank of Kalman Filters 
 
When systems matrices 𝐴𝑘, 𝐵𝑘, 𝐶𝑘 and 𝐷𝑘 are known and, the value of 
measurement noise covariance 𝑊𝑘 and the value of state noise covariance 𝑉𝑘 are 
available, it is easy to obtain the state estimate by implementing the Kalman. On the other 
hand, the process above would not be so easy when there are some uncertainties in the 
system model. For example, consider the sensor intrusion problem, a hacker come into 
the system and then modifies the system measurement state by replacing the state signal 
𝐶𝑘𝑒𝑘 with another one, then it will be hard for letting the Kalman filter to obtain the 
precise value of the system state estimate even with a large initial error covariance 𝑃𝑘 and 
an educated guess of the initial state estimate ?̂?0.    
 
In this technique, the parameter of a system can be adaptively estimated if the 
assumptions of the parameter can be made properly. Suppose the unknown parameter 
belongs to a discrete set which has known upper and lower bounds, and this set includes 
N values where each value is a possible value or a hypothesis for the unknown parameter, 
then the set of each possible values or hypothesis could be represented as θ =
 {θ1, θ2, … , θ𝑖, … , θ𝑁 }.  So, N number of Kalman filters can be designed specifically 
corresponding to each possible values of the unknown parameter. After knowing each 
possible hypothesis for the unknown parameter, the next step is to calculate the 
conditional probabilities for each hypothesis based on the Bayes’ rule and, after that the 
specific Kalman filter with a conditional probability that is closest to one represents the 
most probable value of the unknown parameter [19, 20].  
 
22 
 
 
 
2.3.1 Derivation of a bank of Kalman filters 
 
Knowing the possible values of the unknown parameter can be represented as θ =
 {θ1, θ2, … , θ𝑖, … , θ𝑁 }, Bayes’ rule can be used as follows  
 
𝑝(θ𝑖|𝑌𝑘) =  
𝑝(𝑌𝑘, θ𝑖)
𝑝(𝑌𝑘)
  
= 
𝑝(𝑌𝑘|θ𝑖)𝑝(θ𝑖)
∑ 𝑝(𝑌𝑘|θ𝑖)𝑝(θ𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
(2.17) 
 
Here, 𝑝(θ𝑖|𝑌𝑘) represent the conditional probabilities of each hypothesis θ𝑖 and 𝑌𝑘 
represents all the system measurements up throuth time instant k. The 𝑝(𝑌𝑘|θ𝑖) are 
defined as the likelihood functions for each hypothesis and they are used for the recursive 
calculation of a bank of conditional Kalman filters [19]. (2.17) is further expanded and 
simplified as 
 
𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌𝑘) =  
𝑝(𝑦𝑘, 𝑌𝑘−1, 𝜃𝑖)
𝑝(𝑦𝑘, 𝑌𝑘−1)
 
= 
𝑝(𝑦𝑘, 𝜃𝑖|𝑌𝑘−1)𝑝(𝑌𝑘−1)
𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1)𝑝(𝑌𝑘−1)
 
= 
𝑝(𝑦𝑘, 𝜃𝑖|𝑌𝑘−1)
𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1)
 
=  
𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝜃𝑖)𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌𝑘−1)
∑ 𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝜃𝑖)𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌𝑘−1)
𝑁
𝑖=1
(2.18) 
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where 𝑦𝑘 represents the system measurement at time 𝑘, 𝑌𝑘−1 represents all system 
measurements from 𝑘 = 1 through 𝑘 − 1 and, as mentioned above, 𝜃𝑖 represents the 
possible value for the unknown parameter where each Kalman filter is designed 
specifically corresponding to each 𝜃𝑖. This equation can be solved recursively, and the 
calculation could begin with an assumed probability 𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌0) between 0 and 1 when 𝑘 =
0, where the sum of the probabilities is one. Note that 𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌𝑘−1) is the previous value of 
𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌𝑘). 
 
After that, the most important step is to calculate 𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝜃𝑖) where it is part of 
the probability density function in (2.18). In this work, system state noise and 
measurement noise are all assumed to have Gaussian distribution, which produces 
Gaussian conditional probabilities. Therefore, 𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝜃𝑖) could be represented as 
(2.19) because the density function of Gaussian is known 
 
𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝜃𝑖) =  (2𝜋)
−𝑚 2⁄ |Ω𝑘|𝜃𝑖
−1 |
1
2⁄ exp {−
1
2
?̃?𝑘|𝜃𝑖
𝑇 Ω𝑘|𝜃𝑖
−1 ?̃?𝑘|𝜃𝑖} (2.19) 
 
where 𝑚 is the order of the system, ?̃?𝑘|𝜃𝑖 is the innovation sequence where each Kalman 
filter is responsible for estimation based on its corresponding hypothesis 𝜃𝑖 
 
?̃?𝑘|𝜃𝑖 = 𝑦𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘|𝑘−1,𝜃𝑖 (2.20) 
 
and Ω𝑘|𝜃𝑖 is the innovation covariance for each Kalman filter with its corresponding 
hypothesis where it could be calculated from below 
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Ω𝑘|𝜃𝑖 = 𝐶𝑘𝑃𝑘|𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑘
𝑇 + 𝐺𝑘𝑊𝑘𝐺𝑘
𝑇 (2.21) 
 
Therefore, the conditional probability of each Kalman filter can be found using equation 
(2.18), (2.19), (2.20) and (2.21). The convergence will occur when there is a hypothesis 
closest to the correct value and that probability will be equal to one for this assumption 
while all the probabilities of other possible values of  𝜃𝑖 will go to zero [20]. 
 
2.3.2 Algorithm of a bank of Kalman filters 
 
Suppose θ =  {θ1, θ2, … , θ𝑖, … , θ𝑁 } where N represents the quantities of possible 
values for the unknown parameter, where the upper and lower bounds can be defined as 
θ1 and θ𝑁, which means the possible values of the unknown parameter is included in this 
range. After knowing the set of the hypotheses, a bank of Kalman filters is set up where 
each Kalman filter is designed specifically with its associated hypothesis and, then ?̃?𝑘|𝜃𝑖 
and Ω𝑘|𝜃𝑖 could be calculated by substituting the estimated measurement ?̂?𝑘|𝑘−1,𝜃𝑖 and the 
error covariance 𝑃𝑘|𝜃𝑖 to equation (2.20) and (2.21). After knowing ?̃?𝑘|𝜃𝑖 and Ω𝑘|𝜃𝑖 for 
each possible value of the unknown parameter, the conditional probabilities 𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌𝑘) can 
be calculated recursively using equation (2.18) and the one which is closest to one 
represents the true value of the unknown parameter. Fig 2.3 shows the flowchart of the 
bank of Kalman filters algorithm.  
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Conditional  
Probability  
Density  
Estimates 
Hypothesis 1 
𝜃 =  𝜃1 
Hypothesis 2 
𝜃 =  𝜃2 
…
…
…
…
 
Hypothesis N 
𝜃 =  𝜃𝑁 
𝑦𝑘  
Hypothesis 
Selection 
𝜃𝑖 
𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌𝑘) 
Conditional State 
Estimates 𝑥𝑘|𝜃1  
𝑥𝑘|𝜃2
2 
𝑥𝑘|𝜃𝑁 
Figure 2.3: Flowchart of a bank of Kalman filters algorithm [19] 
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3 SYSTEM MODELING  
 
In this chapter, a first-order and a second-order discrete time-invariant system will 
be used separately, and the performance of both systems will be shown. After knowing 
both systems’ performance, the constant-type attack signal and the ramp-type attack 
signal will enter the systems, replacing the systems’ output to affect the intrusion, so that 
the sensor cannot relay the true measurement signal. The performance of both the 
affected first-order and second-order system will be shown. The flow chart of the sensor 
intrusion process is shown in Fig 3.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Flowchart of the sensor intrusion process 
 
 
3.1 Model of the First-Order System 
 
Consider a first-order discrete-time stochastic system with state and measurement 
noise  
 
𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘𝑢𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘𝑣𝑘 (3.1𝑎) 
 
System Sensor 
True 
measurement 
System 
input 
Attack signal 
Affected 
measurement  
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𝑦𝑘 = 𝐶𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘𝑢𝑘 + 𝐺𝑘𝑤𝑘 (3.1𝑏) 
 
Where 𝐴𝑘 = 0.9,  𝐵𝑘 = 0, 𝐶𝑘 = 1, 𝐷𝑘 = 0, 𝐹𝑘 = 1, 𝐺𝑘 = 1, and the covariance of the 
system state noise 𝑉𝑘 = 0.1, the covariance of the system measurement noise 𝑊𝑘 = 0.05 
and both of the system state and measurement noises are zero-mean white and Gaussian. 
Therefore, the system can be represented as (3.2a) and (3.2b) 
 
𝑥𝑘+1 =  0.9𝑥𝑘 + 𝑣𝑘 (3.2𝑎) 
 
𝑦𝑘 = 𝑥𝑘  + 𝑤𝑘 (3.2𝑏) 
 
It can be noticed that this system is asymptotically stable from its system matrix 𝐴𝑘. Fig 
3.2 and Fig 3.3 show the system state and system measurement responses with its initial 
state 𝑥0 = 2 from 𝑘 = 0 to 200. 
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Figure 3.2: The First-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response with its 
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐. 
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Figure 3.3: The First-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system measurement response 
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐. 
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3.2 Attack Model for the First-Order System  
 
3.2.1 Constant-Type Attack Signal  
 
Consider the first-order discrete time-invariant system (3.2a) and (3.2b), where a 
hacker affects an intrusion, replacing most of the signal component of the system 
measurement by a constant signal ℎ𝑘 at a certain time. Then the model would be 
modified as below after hacking happens  
  
[
𝑥𝑘+1
ℎ𝑘+1
] =  [
0.9 0
0 1
] [
𝑥𝑘
ℎ𝑘
] + [
1
0
] 𝑣𝑘 (3.3𝑎) 
 
𝑦𝑘 = [0.05 1] [
𝑥𝑘
ℎ𝑘
]  + 𝑤𝑘 (3.3𝑏) 
 
Here, ℎ𝑘 is a time-invariant constant-type intrusion signal where ℎ𝑘 = ℎ𝑘+1, whose 
model is added to the state equation. It can be found that the model is changed with its 
associated intrusion signal, where 𝐴𝑘 = [
0.9 0
0 1
],  𝐵𝑘 = 0, 𝐶𝑘 = [0.05 1], 𝐷𝑘 = 0, 
𝐹𝑘 = [
1
0
] and 𝐺𝑘 = 1. While, one can find that the system measurement is not completely 
replaced by the intrusion signal from 𝐶𝑘 = [0.05 1], there is still some “unhacked” 
measurements left, and this is because if the hacker replaces the whole measurement with 
a constant-type attack signal ℎ𝑘, the model would be unobservable and the intrusion 
could be detected very easily by the failure of the Kalman filter used in estimating the 
state.  
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Suppose the intrusion happens at a certain time 𝑘 > 0 when the system is running, 
and in this thesis, the time point 𝑘 when intrusion happens is called “shiftpoint”, which 
represents that the system is hacked at time 𝑘, and as for hackers, they could select any 
shiftpoint to attack the system. Here, three different shiftpoints 𝑘 = 50, 𝑘 = 100 and 𝑘 =
150 are selected arbitrarily to show the changes of model state and measurement when 
there is a constant-type attack signal ℎ𝑘 = 10 enters the system  
 
 
Figure 3.4: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system state response with its 
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at shiftpoint 
𝒌 = 𝟓𝟎. 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement state 
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟓𝟎. 
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Figure 3.6: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system state response with its 
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at shiftpoint 
𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎. 
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Figure 3.7: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement state 
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎. 
  
35 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system state response with its 
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at shiftpoint 
𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎. 
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Figure 3.9: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement state 
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎. 
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3.2.2 Step and ramp-type Attack Signal 
 
Consider the first-order discrete time-invariant system (3.2a) and (3.2b), where a 
hacker enters the system, replaces most of the signal component of the system 
measurement by a step and step and ramp-type signal ℎ𝑘 at a certain time. Then the 
system model would be modified as below after hacking happens  
 
[
𝑥𝑘+1
ℎ𝑘+1
1
ℎ𝑘+1
2
] =  [
0.9 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
] [
𝑥𝑘
ℎ𝑘
1
ℎ𝑘
2
] + [
1
0
0
] 𝑣𝑘 (3.4a) 
 
𝑦𝑘 = [0.05 1 1] [
𝑥𝑘
ℎ𝑘
1
ℎ𝑘
2
] + 𝑤𝑘 (3.4𝑏) 
 
Here, ℎ𝑘
1  is a step and ramp-type and ℎ𝑘
2 is a step-type hacking signal with the state space 
models 
 
ℎ𝑘+1 = [
ℎ𝑘+1
1
ℎ𝑘+1
2 ] =  [
1 1
0 1
] [
ℎ𝑘
1
ℎ𝑘
2] (3.5) 
 
And this step and ramp-type signal could be shown as Fig 3.10 with its initial value ℎ0 =
 [
1
0.1
]  
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Figure 3.10: Step and Step and ramp-type intrusion signal with its initial response 
𝒉𝟎 = [
𝟏
𝟎. 𝟏
]. 
 
also, it can be found that the whole system is changed with its associated intrusion signal, 
where 𝐴𝑘 = [
0.9 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
],  𝐵𝑘 = 0, 𝐶𝑘 = [0.05 1 1], 𝐷𝑘 = 0, 𝐹𝑘 = [
1
0
0
] and 𝐺𝑘 = 1. 
As mentioned above, the system measurement could not be replaced completely by the 
intrusion signal from 𝐶𝑘 = [0.05 1 1] because of the unobservability of the system. 
There is still some “unhacked” measurement needs to be left to make sure the 
modification of the system measurement cannot be detected easily.  
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Here, three different shiftpoints 𝑘 = 50, 𝑘 = 100 and 𝑘 = 150 are selected 
arbitrarily to show the changes of system state and system measurement when there is a 
step and ramp-type attack signal (3.5) enters the system  
 
 
Figure 3.11: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system state response with its 
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Step and ramp-type sensor intrusion happens at 
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎. 
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Figure 3.12: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement state 
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎. 
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Figure 3.13: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system state response with its 
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion happens at 
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎. 
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Figure 3.14: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement state 
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎. 
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Figure 3.15: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system state response with its 
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion happens at 
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎. 
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Figure 3.16: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement state 
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎. 
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3.3 The Second-Order System Model 
 
Consider a second-order discrete-time stochastic system with state and 
measurement noise  
 
𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘𝑢𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘𝑣𝑘 (3.6𝑎) 
 
𝑦𝑘 = 𝐶𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘𝑢𝑘 + 𝐺𝑘𝑤𝑘 (3.6𝑏) 
 
where 𝐴𝑘 = [
0 0.9
−1 −1
],  𝐵𝑘 = 0, 𝐶𝑘 = [1 1], 𝐷𝑘 = 0, 𝐹𝑘 = [
1
0
], 𝐺𝑘 = 1, and the 
covariance of the system state noise 𝑣𝑘 = 1, the covariance of the system measurement 
noise 𝑤𝑘 = 1 and both of the system state and measurement noises are zero mean, white 
and Gaussian. Therefore, the system can be represented as (3.7a) and (3.7b) 
 
𝑥𝑘+1 = [
0 0.9
−1 −1
] 𝑥𝑘  +  [
1
0
] 𝑣𝑘 (3.7𝑎) 
 
𝑦𝑘 = [1 1]𝑥𝑘  +  𝑤𝑘 (3.7𝑏) 
 
It can be noticed that this system is also an asymptotically stable system where the 
system’s eigenvalues are   −0.5 ±  0.8062i, which are inside the unit circle. Fig 3.10a, 
Fig 3.10b and Fig 3.11 show the system state value and system measurement response 
with the initial state 𝑥0 = [
2
2
] from 𝑘 = 0 to 200. 
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Figure 3.17: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state 𝒙𝟏response 
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
]. 
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Figure 3.18: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state 𝒙𝟐 response 
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
]. 
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Figure 3.19: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system measurement 
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
]. 
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3.4 Attack Model for the Second-Order System 
 
3.4.1 Constant-Type Attack Signal 
 
Consider the second-order discrete time-invariant system (3.7a) and (3.7b), where 
a hacker enters the system, replace most of the signal component of the system 
measurement to a constant signal ℎ𝑘 at a certain shiftpoint. Then the system model would 
be modified as below after the intrusion happens 
 
[
𝑥𝑘+1
1
𝑥𝑘+1
2
ℎ𝑘+1
] =  [
0 0.9 0
−1 −1 0
0 0 1
] [
𝑥𝑘
1
𝑥𝑘
2
ℎ𝑘
] + [
1
0
0
] 𝑣𝑘 (3.8𝑎) 
 
𝑦𝑘 = [0 0.1 1]𝑥𝑘  + 𝑤𝑘 (3.8𝑏) 
 
Here, ℎ𝑘 is a time-invariant constant-type intrusion signal where ℎ𝑘 = ℎ𝑘+1, and it can 
be found that the whole system is changed with its associated intrusion signal, where 
𝐴𝑘 = [
0 0.9 0
−1 −1 0
0 0 1
],  𝐵𝑘 = 0, 𝐶𝑘 = [0 0.1 1], 𝐷𝑘 = 0, 𝐹𝑘 = [
1
0
0
] and 𝐺𝑘 = 1. While, 
it can also be noticed that the system measurement is not replaced completely by the 
intrusion signal from 𝐶𝑘 = [0 0.1 1], and that is because if the hacker wants to 
replace the whole states into the intrusion signal, then 𝐶𝑘 = [0 0 1] and in this case, 
the system would be unobservable. Thus, as mentioned, hackers cannot replace the whole 
states completely and they need to leave some “unhacked” measurement to keep the 
system observable so that the intrusion could not be found easily.  
50 
 
 
 
Here, three different shiftpoints 𝑘 = 100, 𝑘 = 250 and 𝑘 = 400 are selected 
arbitrarily to show the changes of system state and system measurement when there is a 
constant-type attack signal ℎ𝑘 = 10 enters the system  
 
 
Figure 3.20: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟏 
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at 
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎. 
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Figure 3.21: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟐 
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at 
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎. 
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Figure 3.22: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system measurement 
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎. 
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Figure 3.23: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟏 
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at 
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎. 
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Figure 3.24: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟐 
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at 
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎. 
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Figure 3.25: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system measurement 
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎. 
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Figure 3.26: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟏 
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at 
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟒𝟎𝟎. 
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Figure 3.27: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟐 
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at 
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟒𝟎𝟎. 
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Figure 3.28: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system measurement 
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟒𝟎𝟎. 
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3.4.2 Ramp-Type Attack Signal 
 
Consider the second-order discrete time-invariant system (3.7a) and (3.7b), where 
a hacker enters the system, replace most of the signal component of the system 
measurement to a setp and ramp-type signal ℎ𝑘 at a certain shiftpoint. Then the system 
model would be modified as below after the intrusion happens 
 
[
 
 
 
 
𝑥𝑘+1
1
𝑥𝑘+1
2
ℎ𝑘+1
1
ℎ𝑘+1
2 ]
 
 
 
 
=  [
0 0.9 0 0
−1 −1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
]
[
 
 
 
 
𝑥𝑘
1
𝑥𝑘
2
ℎ𝑘
1
ℎ𝑘
2]
 
 
 
 
+ [
1
0
0
0
] 𝑣𝑘 (3.9𝑎) 
 
𝑦𝑘 = [0 0.1 1 0]𝑥𝑘  +  𝑤𝑘 (3.9𝑏) 
 
Here, ℎ𝑘 is a step and ramp-type intrusion signal where it is the same signal as mentioned 
in (3.5) and because of the intrusion signal is added into the system, the system matrices 
are changed, where 𝐴𝑘 = [
0 0.9 0 0
−1 −1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
], 𝐵𝑘 = 0, 𝐶𝑘 = [0 0.1 1 0], 𝐷𝑘 = 0, 
𝐹𝑘 = [
1
0
0
0
] and 𝐺𝑘 = 1. While, as mentioned before, it can be noticed that the system 
measurement is not replaced completely by the intrusion signal from 𝐶𝑘 =
[0 0.1 1 0], if the hacker wants to replace both states into the intrusion signal, then 
𝐶𝑘 = [0 0 1 0] and in this case, the system would be unobservable. Thus, in order 
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to make sure the intrusion could not be found easily, hackers still need to leave some 
“unhacked” measurement to keep the system be observable.  
 
Here, three different shiftpoints 𝑘 = 100, 𝑘 = 250 and 𝑘 = 400 are selected 
arbitrarily to show the changes of system state and system measurement when there is a 
step and ramp-type intrusion signal ℎ𝑘 enters the system  
 
 
Figure 3.29: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟏 
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎. 
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Figure 3.30: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟐 
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎. 
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Figure 3.31: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system measurement 
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor 
intrusion happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎. 
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Figure 3.32: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟏 
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎. 
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Figure 3.33: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟐 
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎. 
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Figure 3.34: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system measurement 
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor 
intrusion happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎. 
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Figure 3.35: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟏 
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟒𝟎𝟎. 
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Figure 3.36: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟏 
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟒𝟎𝟎. 
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Figure 3.37: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system measurement 
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor 
intrusion happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟒𝟎𝟎. 
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4 DETECTION OF ATTACKS AND CASE STUDIES 
 
In this chapter, the Constant-Type Intrusion Signal and the Ramp-Type Intrusion 
Signal targeting the systems mentioned in chapter 3 will be detected by using a bank of 
Kalman filters algorithm which is introduced in chapter 2. The estimated value of each 
system states and measurements will be shown and the probabilities of the state 
(affected/unaffected) of each control system will be calculated as a function of time. The 
estimation of the states from a bank of Kalman filters together with the associated 
probabilities will also be calculated as a function of time and, by showing the 
probabilities of each state (affected/unaffected) based on the data from the bank of 
Kalman filters, it’s determined whether the sensor is under attack or not. The 
performance of the algorithm will be tested based on various levels of system and 
measurement noises. An alternative estimation method (sample mean method) will also 
be introduced and the performance of that algorithm will also be shown. 
 
4.1 First-Order System with Constant-Type Intrusion Signal 
 
Consider the first-order system mentioned in chapter 3, where the system is 
shown as (4.1a) and (4.1b),  
𝑥𝑘+1 =  0.9𝑥𝑘 + 𝑣𝑘 (4.1𝑎) 
 
𝑦𝑘
1 = 𝑥𝑘  + 𝑤𝑘 (4.1𝑏) 
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where 𝐴1 = 0.9,  𝐵1 = 0, 𝐶1 = 1, 𝐷1 = 0, 𝐹1 = 1, 𝐺1 = 1, and the covariance of the 
system state noise 𝑉 = 0.1, the covariance of the system measurement noise 𝑊 = 0.05 
and both system state noise and system measurement noise are Gaussian. Note that the 
superscript 1 represents the system is currently not under attack. 
 
Before estimating system state and measurement, the observability of this first-
order system needs to be checked and it could be checked easily by using the system 
matrices 𝐴1 and 𝐶1 with the observability criteria, which shows the system is observable.  
 
Then, the system estimated state and measurement can be observed using the 
Kalman Filter by setting up the system’s initial state estimate ?̂?0 and initial error 
covariance 𝑃0
1 based on system’s uncertainty. According to (2.10), (2.11), (2.12) and 
(2.13), the Kalman Filter can be expressed as below 
 
𝑃𝑘+1
1 = 𝐴1𝑃𝑘
1𝐴1
𝑇
 + 𝐹1𝑉𝐹1
𝑇
− 𝐴1𝑃𝑘
1𝐶1
𝑇
 (𝐶1𝑃𝑘
1𝐶1
𝑇
+ 𝐺1𝑊𝐺1
𝑇
)
−1
(𝐶1𝑃𝑘
1𝐴1
𝑇
) (4.2) 
 
𝐾𝑘
1 = 𝐴1𝑃𝑘
1𝐶1
𝑇
 (𝐶1𝑃𝑘
1𝐶1
𝑇
+ 𝐺1𝑊𝐺1
𝑇
)
−1
(4.3) 
 
?̂?𝑘+1 = 𝐴
1?̂?𝑘 +  𝐾𝑘
1?̃?𝑘
1 (4.4) 
 
?̃?𝑘
1 = 𝑦𝑘
1 − 𝐶1?̂?𝑘 (4.5) 
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Here, the system measurement estimate is defined as 
 
?̂?𝑘
1 =  𝐶1?̂?𝑘 (4.6) 
 
The attack model of this first-order system can be known from (3.3a) and (3.3b) 
 
[
𝑥𝑘+1
ℎ𝑘+1
] =  [
0.9 0
0 1
] [
𝑥𝑘
ℎ𝑘
] + [
1
0
] 𝑣𝑘 (4.7𝑎) 
 
𝑦𝑘
2 = [0.05 1] [
𝑥𝑘
ℎ𝑘
]  + 𝑤𝑘 (4.7𝑏) 
 
From the previous chapter, it could be known that ℎ𝑘 is a constant-type intrusion signal 
where ℎ𝑘 = ℎ𝑘+1 = 10, and it can be found that the whole system is changed to a 
second-order system with its associated intrusion signal, where 𝐴2 = [
0.9 0
0 1
],  𝐵2 = 0, 
𝐶2 = [0.05 1], 𝐷2 = 0, 𝐹2 = [
1
0
] and 𝐺2 = 1. Note that superscript 2 represents the 
system is currently under attack. 
 
Similarly, the observability of this second-order attack model needs to be 
checked, by submitting 𝐴2 and 𝐶2 into 𝑂2, where 
 
𝑂2 = [
𝐶2
𝐶2𝐴2
] =  [
0.05 1
0.045 1
] 
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Here, 𝑂2 represents the observability matrix for this second-order attack model 
and it can be known that 𝑂2 is full rank, which shows the system is observable. 
 
Knowing the observability of this attack model, the estimated state and 
measurement of this second-order system can be estimated using the Kalman Filter by 
setting up the system’s initial state estimate ?̂?0, initial value of the intrusion signal 
estimate ℎ0 and initial error covariance 𝑃0
2 based on this system state’s uncertainty. 
According to (2.10), (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13), the Kalman Filter can be expressed as 
below 
 
𝑃𝑘+1
2 = 𝐴2𝑃𝑘
2𝐴2
𝑇
 +  𝐹2𝑉𝐹2
𝑇
− 𝐴2𝑃𝑘
2𝐶2
𝑇
 (𝐶2𝑃𝑘
2𝐶2
𝑇
+ 𝐺2𝑊𝐺2
𝑇
)
−1
(𝐶2𝑃𝑘
2𝐴2
𝑇
) (4.8) 
 
𝐾𝑘
2 = 𝐴2𝑃𝑘
2𝐶2
𝑇
 (𝐶2𝑃𝑘
2𝐶2
𝑇
+ 𝐺2𝑊𝐺2
𝑇
)
−1
(4.9) 
 
?̂?𝑘+1 = 𝐴
2?̂?𝑘 +  𝐾𝑘
2?̃?𝑘
2 (4.10) 
 
?̃?𝑘
2 = 𝑦𝑘
2 − 𝐶2?̂?𝑘 (4.11) 
 
Here, the system measurement estimate could also be known form above, where  
 
?̂?𝑘
2 =  𝐶2?̂?𝑘 (4.12) 
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After calculating both system measurement estimates ?̂?𝑘
1 and ?̂?𝑘
2system innovation 
terms ?̃?𝑘
1 and ?̃?𝑘
2, the conditional probabilities of each hypothesis θ𝑖 could also be found. 
Note that θ =  {θ1, θ2}, where θ1 represents the hypothesis when the system is not under 
attack and θ2 represents the system is under attack. According (2.15), (2.16), (2.17) and 
(2.18), the conditional probabilities of each hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌𝑘) could be found. 
 
From the chapter 2, the first step of getting 𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌𝑘) is to calculate each 
covariance for each Kalman Filter with its corresponding hypothesis Ω𝑘|𝜃𝑖, where 
 
Ω𝑘|𝜃1 = 𝐶
1𝑃𝑘|𝜃1𝐶
1𝑇 + 𝐺1𝑊𝐺1
𝑇
(4.13) 
 
Here, Ω𝑘|𝜃1 represents the covariance for the hypothesis θ1, where the system is 
currently not under attack and 𝑃𝑘|𝜃1 = 𝑃𝑘
1. Thus,  Ω𝑘|𝜃1 could be calculated by 
submitting system matrices 𝐶1, 𝐺1, system measurement noise 𝑊 and system error 
covariance 𝑃𝑘
1 from (4.2). 
 
Similarly, Ω𝑘|𝜃2 represents the covariance for the hypothesis θ2, where the system 
is currently under attack and 𝑃𝑘|𝜃2 = 𝑃𝑘
2. Thus,  Ω𝑘|𝜃2 could be calculated by submitting 
system matrices 𝐶2, 𝐺2, system measurement noise W and system error covariance 𝑃𝑘
2 
from (4.8). and Ω𝑘|𝜃2 could be shown as below 
 
Ω𝑘|𝜃2 = 𝐶
2𝑃𝑘|𝜃2𝐶
2𝑇 + 𝐺2𝑊𝐺2
𝑇
(4.14) 
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After calculating Ω𝑘|𝜃1 and Ω𝑘|𝜃2, the second step of getting 𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌𝑘) is to 
calculate the likelihood function 𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝜃𝑖), where it is part of the probability density 
function in (2.15) and it could be known from (2.16) by submitting Ω𝑘|𝜃1, Ω𝑘|𝜃2, ?̃?𝑘|𝜃1, 
and ?̃?𝑘|𝜃2. Note that ?̃?𝑘|𝜃1 = ?̃?𝑘
1 and ?̃?𝑘|𝜃2 = ?̃?𝑘
2,. 
 
𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝜃1) =  (2𝜋)
−𝑚 2⁄ |Ω𝑘|𝜃1
−1 |
1
2⁄ exp {−
1
2
?̃?𝑘|𝜃1
𝑇 Ω𝑘|𝜃1
−1 ?̃?𝑘|𝜃1} (4.15) 
 
𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝜃2) =  (2𝜋)
−𝑚 2⁄ |Ω𝑘|𝜃2
−1 |
1
2⁄ exp {−
1
2
?̃?𝑘|𝜃2
𝑇 Ω𝑘|𝜃2
−1 ?̃?𝑘|𝜃2} (4.16) 
 
In (4.15),  𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝜃1) represents the likelihood function when the system is 
not under attack, and 𝑚 = 1 because the unhacked system is a first order system as 
mentioned in (4.1a) and (4.1b). Similarly,  𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝜃2) represents the likelihood 
function in (4.16) when the system is under attack, and 𝑚 = 2 because when the system 
is under attack, it will become a second order system mentioned in (4.7a) and (4.7b) with 
its associate constant-type intrusion signal. 
 
After calculating the likelihood function for both cases (hacked/ not hacked), the 
conditional probabilities of each hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌𝑘) could be found by submitting (4.15) 
and (4.16) to (2.15) separately, where 
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𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) =  
𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝜃1)𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘−1)
∑ 𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝜃1)𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘−1)
𝑁
𝑖=1
(4.17) 
 
𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) =  
𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝜃2)𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘−1)
∑ 𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝜃2)𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘−1)
𝑁
𝑖=1
(4.18) 
 
Here, (4.17) and (4.18) can be solved recursively, and the calculation would begin with 
an initial probability 𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌0) between 0 and 1 when 𝑘 = 0, note that 𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌𝑘−1) is the 
previous value of 𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌𝑘). 
 
The simulation results can be shown by submitting the two systems 
(hacked/unhacked) matrices into a bank of Kalman Filters and Fig. 4.1 shows the changes 
of the system measurement before and after it’s being hacked.  
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Figure 4.1: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement y with its 
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 and the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at shiftpoint 
𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎. 
 
As mentioned, before the constant-type intrusion signal enters this first-order 
system, the system measurement is 𝑦𝑘
1 = 𝑥𝑘  + 𝑤𝑘 like what Fig 4.1 shows before 𝑘 =
100. After that, the intrusion signal replaces the system measurement so that 𝑦𝑘
2 =
 [0.05 1] [
𝑥𝑘
ℎ𝑘
]  + 𝑤𝑘 like what Fig 4.1 shows after  𝑘 = 100. 
 
After showing the system measurement, the next step is to calculate the system 
state and measurement estimate by using a bank of Kalman Filters. By submitting (4.2), 
(4.3), (4.4) and (4.6) to (4.5) with its initial state estimate ?̂?0 = 1 and initial error 
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covariance 𝑃0
1 = 100, the innovation term ?̃?𝑘
1 could be calculated. Similarly, by 
submitting (4.8), (4.9), (4.10) and (4.12) to (4.11) with its initial state estimate [
?̂?0
ℎ̂0
] =
 [
0
0
] and initial error covariance 𝑃0
2 = [
100 0
0 100
], the innovation term ?̃?𝑘
2 could also be 
calculated. Fig 4.2 shows the innovation terms ?̃?𝑘
1 and ?̃?𝑘
2 in time 
 
Figure 4.2: The innovation terms ?̃?𝒌
𝟏 and ?̃?𝒌
𝟐 when there is a constant-type intrusion 
signal at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎 
 
After finding the innovation term ?̃?𝑘
1 and ?̃?𝑘
2, the likelihood function (4.15) and 
(4.16) could be calculated and the conditional probabilities of each hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) 
and 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) could be found by submitting the likelihood function (4.15) and (4.16) to 
(2.15) separately and by setting up both the initial probability 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌0) = 0.5 and 
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𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌0) = 0.5 when 𝑘 = 0, the conditional probabilities of each hypothesis can be 
shown as Fig 4.3, note that the intrusion happens at shiftpoint 𝑘 = 100 
 
Figure 4.3: Conditional probabilities of each hypothesis 𝒑(𝜽𝟏|𝒀𝒌) (unhacked case) 
and 𝒑(𝜽𝟐|𝒀𝒌) (hacked case) when there is a constant-type intrusion signal enters the 
system at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎, starting with each initial probability 𝒑(𝜽𝟏|𝒀𝟎) = 𝟎. 𝟓 
and 𝒑(𝜽𝟐|𝒀𝟎) = 𝟎. 𝟓 
 
From Fig 4.3, it could be noticed that both the hacked and unhacked cases are all 
start with the initial probability 𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌0) = 0.5. The conditional probability for the 
unhacked case 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) convergences to 1 very quickly and keeps convergence until the 
shiftpoint 𝑘 = 100, and on the other hand, the conditional probability for the hacked case 
𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) convergences to 0 very quickly and keeps convergence until the shiftpoint 𝑘 =
100, which means that the system is not under attack when 𝑘 < 100. When the shiftpoint 
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𝑘 = 100, which represents the system measurement is now replaced by the constant-type 
intrusion signal and now the conditional probability for the unhacked case 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) 
convergences to 0 from 1 very quickly and keeps convergence when the shiftpoint 𝑘 >
100, and on the other hand, the conditional probability for the hacked case 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) 
convergences to 1 form 0 very quickly and keeps convergence when the shiftpoint 𝑘 >
100, which means that the system is now under attack when 𝑘 > 100.  Note that the 
convergence time for 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) = 1 when 𝑘 < 100 is 𝑘 = 2, and the convergence time 
for 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) = 1 when 𝑘 > 100 is 𝑘 = 102, which means the algorithm designed in this 
thesis works very well under this condition. 
 
4.2 First-Order System with Ramp-Type Intrusion Signal 
 
Consider the first-order system (4.1a) and (4.1b), where the hacker enters the 
system, replace the system measurement to a step and ramp-type intrusion signal and in 
this case, the attack model of this first-order system can be known from (3.4a) and (3.4b) 
and it could be shown below 
 
[
𝑥𝑘+1
ℎ𝑘+1
1
ℎ𝑘+1
2
] =  [
0.9 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
] [
𝑥𝑘
ℎ𝑘
1
ℎ𝑘
2
] + [
1
0
0
] 𝑣𝑘 (4.19a) 
 
𝑦𝑘
2 = [0.05 1 1] [
𝑥𝑘
ℎ𝑘
1
ℎ𝑘
2
] + 𝑤𝑘 (4.19𝑏) 
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From the previous chapter, it could be known that ℎ𝑘 is now a ramp-type 
intrusion signal where ℎ𝑘+1 = [
ℎ𝑘+1
1
ℎ𝑘+1
2 ] =  [
1 1
0 1
] [
ℎ𝑘
1
ℎ𝑘
2], and it can be found that the whole 
system is changed to a third-order system with its associated intrusion signal, where 𝐴2 =
[
0.9 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
],  𝐵2 = 0, 𝐶2 = [0.05 1 1], 𝐷2 = 0, 𝐹2 = [
1
0
0
] and 𝐺2 = 1. Similarly, 
superscript 2 represents the system is currently under attack, and the intrusion signal is 
now a ramp-type signal. Fig 4.4 shows the changes of the system measurement y when 
the step and ramp-type sensor intrusion happened at shiftpoint 𝑘 = 100. 
 
Figure 4.4: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement y with its 
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 and the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion happens at 
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎. 
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As usual, the observability of this third-order system needs to be checked by 
submitting 𝐴2 and 𝐶2 into 𝑂2, where 
 
𝑂2 = [
𝐶2
𝐶2𝐴2
𝐶2𝐴2
2
] =  [
0.05 1 1
0.045 1 2
0.0405 1 3
] 
 
Here, 𝑂2 represents the observability matrix for this third-order attack model and 
it can be known that 𝑂2 is full rank, which shows the system is observable. 
 
Similarly, after knowing the system’s observability, this third order system 
estimated state and measurement can be observed using the Kalman Filter by setting up 
the system’s initial state estimate ?̂?0, initial intrusion signal estimate ℎ̂0 and initial error 
covariance 𝑃0
2 based on the system’s uncertainty. According to (2.10), (2.11), (2.12) and 
(2.13), the system state estimate and measurement estimate could be calculated and after 
that, the system innovation terms ?̃?𝑘
2  can also be calculated with its initial state estimate 
[
?̂?0
ℎ̂0
1
ℎ̂0
2
] =  [
0.1
0
0
] and initial error covariance 𝑃0
2 = [
7 0 0
0 7 0
0 0 7
].  
Fig 4.5 shows the innovation terms ?̃?𝑘
1 and ?̃?𝑘
2 in time, note that the intrusion is the ramp-
type signal now 
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Figure 4.5: The innovation terms ?̃?𝒌
𝟏 and ?̃?𝒌
𝟐 when there is a step and ramp-type 
intrusion signal at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎  
 
    Similar to the constant-type intrusion cases, after finding the innovation term 
?̃?𝑘
1 and ?̃?𝑘
2, the likelihood function (4.15) and (4.16) can be calculated and the conditional 
probabilities of each hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) and 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) can be found by submitting the 
likelihood function (4.15) and (4.16) to (2.15) separately and by setting up both the initial 
probability 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌0) = 0.5 and 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌0) = 0.5 when 𝑘 = 0, the conditional probabilities 
of each hypothesis can be shown as Fig 4.6, note that the intrusion is the step and ramp-
type signal and the intrusion happens at shiftpoint 𝑘 = 100 
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Figure 4.6: Conditional probabilities of each hypothesis 𝒑(𝜽𝟏|𝒀𝒌) (unhacked case) 
and 𝒑(𝜽𝟐|𝒀𝒌) (hacked case) when there is a step and ramp-type intrusion signal 
enters the system at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎, starting with each initial probability 
𝒑(𝜽𝟏|𝒀𝟎) = 𝟎. 𝟓 and 𝒑(𝜽𝟐|𝒀𝟎) = 𝟎. 𝟓 
 
From Fig 4.6, it can be noticed that both the hacked and unhacked cases are all 
start with the initial probability 𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌0) = 0.5. The conditional probability for the 
unhacked case 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) convergences to 1 very quickly and keeps convergence until the 
shiftpoint 𝑘 = 100, and on the other hand, the conditional probability for the hacked case 
𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) convergences to 0 very quickly and keeps convergence until the shiftpoint 𝑘 =
100, which means that the system is not under attack when 𝑘 < 100. When the shiftpoint 
𝑘 = 100, which represents the system measurement is now replaced by the step and 
ramp-type intrusion signal and now the conditional probability for the unhacked case 
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𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) convergences from 1 to 0 very quickly and keeps convergence when the 
shiftpoint 𝑘 > 100, and on the other hand, the conditional probability for the hacked case 
𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) convergences from 0 to 1 very quickly and also keeps convergence, which 
means the system is now under attack when 𝑘 > 100.  Note that the convergence time for 
𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) = 1 when 𝑘 < 100 is 𝑘 = 9, and the convergence time for 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) = 1 when 
𝑘 > 100 is 𝑘 = 102, which shows this estimation algorithm designed in this thesis works 
also well under this step and ramp-type intrusion condition. 
 
4.3 Second-Order System with Constant-Type Intrusion Signal 
 
 
Consider the second-order system mentioned in chapter 3, where the system is 
shown as (4.20a) and (4.20b),  
 
𝑥𝑘+1 = [
0 0.9
−1 −1
] 𝑥𝑘  +  [
1
0
] 𝑣𝑘 (4.20𝑎) 
 
𝑦𝑘
1 = [1 1]𝑥𝑘  +  𝑤𝑘 (4.20𝑏) 
 
where 𝐴1 = [
0 0.9
−1 −1
],  𝐵1 = 0, 𝐶1 = [1 1], 𝐷1 = 0, 𝐹1 = [
1
0
], 𝐺1 = 1, and the 
covariance of the system state noise 𝑉 = 1, the covariance of the system measurement 
noise W = 1 and both system state noise and system measurement noise are Gaussian 
and by using the observability criteria, the observability of the system could be checked 
by submitting 𝐴1 and 𝐶1 into 𝑂1 
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𝑂1 = [ 𝐶
1
𝐶1𝐴1
] =  [
1 1
−1 −0.1
] 
 
Here, 𝑂1 represents the observability matrix for this second-order system and it can be 
known that 𝑂1 is full rank, which shows the system is observable.  
 
In the same time, the attack model of this second-order system can be known 
from (3.8a) and (3.8b) 
[
𝑥𝑘+1
1
𝑥𝑘+1
2
ℎ𝑘+1
] =  [
0 0.9 0
−1 −1 0
0 0 1
] [
𝑥𝑘
1
𝑥𝑘
2
ℎ𝑘
] + [
1
0
0
] 𝑣𝑘 (4.21𝑎) 
 
𝑦𝑘
2 = [0 0.1 1]𝑥𝑘  + 𝑤𝑘 (4.21𝑏) 
 
Here, ℎ𝑘 is a constant-type intrusion signal where ℎ𝑘 = ℎ𝑘+1 = 10, and it can be found 
that the whole system is changed to a third-order system with its associated intrusion 
signal, where 𝐴2 = [
0 0.9 0
−1 −1 0
0 0 1
],  𝐵2 = 0, 𝐶2 = [0 0.1 1], 𝐷2 = 0, 𝐹2 = [
1
0
0
] and 
𝐺2 = 1. 
 
Same as mentioned before, the observability of this third-order system needs to be 
checked by submitting 𝐴2 and 𝐶2 into 𝑂2 
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𝑂2 = [
𝐶2
𝐶2𝐶2
𝐶2𝐴2
2
] =  [
0 0.1 1
−0.1 −0.1 1
0.1 0.01 1
] 
 
Here, 𝑂2 represents the observability matrix for this third-order attack model and it can 
be known that 𝑂2 is full rank, which shows the system is observable. Fig 4.7 shows the 
system measurement y when the constant-type sensor intrusion happens at shiftpoint 𝑘 =
250. 
 
Figure 4.7: The Second-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement y with 
its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [𝟐 𝟐] and the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at 
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎. 
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Before the constant-type intrusion signal enters the system, the system 
measurement is 𝑦𝑘
1 = [1 1]𝑥𝑘  +  𝑤𝑘 like Fig 4.7 shows before 𝑘 = 250. After that, the 
intrusion signal replaces the system measurement so that 𝑦𝑘
2 = [0 0.1 1]𝑥𝑘  +  𝑤𝑘 
like Fig 4.7 shows after  𝑘 = 250. 
 
After knowing the system measurement, the next step is to calculate the system 
state and measurement estimate by using a bank of Kalman Filters. By submitting (4.2), 
(4.3) and (4.4) to (4.5) and (4.5) with its initial state estimate ?̂?0 = [
0
0
] and initial error 
covariance 𝑃0
1 = [
100 0
0 100
], the system measurement estimate ?̂?𝑘
1 and the innovation 
term ?̃?𝑘
1 can be calculated. Similarly, by submitting (4.8), (4.9) and (4.10) to (4.11) and 
(4.12) with its initial state estimate [
?̂?0
ℎ̂0
] = [
0
0
0
] and initial error covariance 𝑃0
2 =
 [
100 0 0
0 100 0
0 0 100
], the system measurement estimate ?̂?𝑘
2 and the innovation term ?̃?𝑘
2 can 
also be calculated. Fig 4.8 shows the innovation terms ?̃?𝑘
1  and ?̃?𝑘
2 in time 
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Figure 4.8: The innovation terms ?̃?𝒌
𝟏 and ?̃?𝒌
𝟐  for the second-order system when there 
is a constant-type intrusion signal at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎.  
 
 
Like the first-order cases introduced previously in this chapter, after finding the 
innovation term ?̃?𝑘
1  and ?̃?𝑘
2, the likelihood function (4.15) and (4.16) can be calculated 
and the conditional probabilities of each hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) and 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) can be found 
by submitting the likelihood function (4.15) and (4.16) to (2.15) separately and by setting 
up both the initial probability 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌0) = 0.5 and 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌0) = 0.5 when 𝑘 = 0, the 
conditional probabilities of each hypothesis can be shown as Fig 4.9, note that the 
intrusion happens at shiftpoint 𝑘 = 250 
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Figure 4.9: Conditional probabilities of each hypothesis 𝒑(𝜽𝟏|𝒀𝒌) (unhacked case) 
and 𝒑(𝜽𝟐|𝒀𝒌) (hacked case) when there is a constant-type intrusion signal enters the 
second-order system at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎, starting with each initial probability 
𝒑(𝜽𝟏|𝒀𝟎) = 𝟎. 𝟓 and 𝒑(𝜽𝟐|𝒀𝟎) = 𝟎. 𝟓 
 
From Fig 4.9, it can be noticed that both the hacked and unhacked cases are all 
start with the initial probability 𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌0) = 0.5. The conditional probability for the 
unhacked case 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) convergences to 1 very quickly and keeps convergence until the 
shiftpoint 𝑘 = 250, and on the other hand, the conditional probability for the hacked case 
𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) convergences to 0 very quickly and keeps convergence until the shiftpoint 𝑘 =
250, which means that the system is not under attack when 𝑘 < 250. When the shiftpoint 
𝑘 = 250, which represents the system measurement is now replaced by the constant-type 
intrusion signal and now the conditional probability for the unhacked case 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) 
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convergences from 1 to 0 very quickly and keeps convergence when the shiftpoint 𝑘 >
250, and on the other hand, the conditional probability for the hacked case 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) 
convergences from 0 to 1 very quickly and also keeps convergence, which means the 
system is now under attack when 𝑘 > 250.  Note that the convergence time for 
𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) = 1 when 𝑘 < 250 is 𝑘 = 3, and the convergence time for 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) = 1 when 
𝑘 > 250 is 𝑘 = 264, which shows this estimation algorithm could also works well for 
the second-order system when there is a constant-type intrusion enters the system. 
 
4.4 Second-Order System with Step and ramp-type Intrusion Signal 
 
 
Consider the second-order system (4.20a) and (4.20b), where the hacker enters the 
system, replace the system measurement to a step and ramp-type intrusion signal and in 
this case, the attack model of this second-order system can be known from (3.9a) and 
(3.9b) and it could be shown below 
 
[
 
 
 
 
𝑥𝑘+1
1
𝑥𝑘+1
2
ℎ𝑘+1
1
ℎ𝑘+1
2 ]
 
 
 
 
=  [
0 0.9 0 0
−1 −1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
]
[
 
 
 
 
𝑥𝑘
1
𝑥𝑘
2
ℎ𝑘
1
ℎ𝑘
2]
 
 
 
 
+ [
1
0
0
0
] 𝑣𝑘 (3.9𝑎) 
 
𝑦𝑘
2 = [0 0.1 1 0]𝑥𝑘  +  𝑤𝑘 (3.9𝑏) 
 
From the previous chapter, it could be known that ℎ𝑘 is a step and ramp-type 
intrusion signal where ℎ𝑘+1 = [
ℎ𝑘+1
1
ℎ𝑘+1
2 ] =  [
1 1
0 1
] [
ℎ𝑘
1
ℎ𝑘
2], and it can be found that the whole 
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system is changed to a fourth-order system with its associated intrusion signal, where 
𝐴2 = [
0 0.9 0 0
−1 −1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
],  𝐵2 = 0, 𝐶2 = [0 0.1 1 0], 𝐷2 = 0, 𝐹2 = [
1
0
0
0
] and 𝐺2 =
1. Similarly, superscript 2 represents the system is currently under attack, and the 
intrusion signal is now a step and ramp-type signal. Fig 4.10 shows the system 
measurement y when the step and ramp-type sensor intrusion happened at shiftpoint 𝑘 =
250. 
 
Figure 4.10: The Second-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement y 
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [
𝟐
𝟐
] and the Step and ramp-type sensor intrusion happens 
at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎. 
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Same as mentioned before, the observability of this fourth-order system needs to 
be checked by submitting 𝐴2 and 𝐶2 into 𝑂2 
 
𝑂2 = [
𝐶2
𝐶2𝐴2
𝐶2𝐴2
2
𝐶2𝐴2
3
] =  [
0 0.1 1 0
−0.1 −0.1 1 1
0.1 0.01 1 2
−0.01 0.08 1 3
] 
 
Here, 𝑂2 represents the observability matrix for this fourth-order attack model and it can 
be known that 𝑂2 is a full rank fourth-order matrix, which shows the system is 
observable. 
 
Knowing the system’s observability, this fourth-order system estimated state and 
measurement can be monitored using the Kalman Filter by setting up the system’s initial 
state estimate ?̂?0, initial intrusion signal estimate ℎ̂0 and initial error covariance 𝑃0
2 based 
on the system state uncertainty. According to (2.10), (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13), the system 
state estimate and measurement estimate can be calculated and after that, the system 
innovation terms ?̃?𝑘
2 can also be calculated with its initial state estimate [
?̂?0
ℎ̂0
] =  [
0
0
0
0
] and 
initial error covariance 𝑃0
2 = [
100 0 0 0
0 100 0 0
0 0 100 0
0 0 0 100
]. Fig 4.5 shows the innovation 
terms ?̃?𝑘
1  and ?̃?𝑘
2 in time 
  
93 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11: The innovation terms?̃?𝒌
𝟏 and ?̃?𝒌
𝟐 for the second-order system when there 
is a step and ramp-type intrusion signal at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎  
 
 
    Similar with the constant-type intrusion cases, after finding the innovation term 
?̃?𝑘
1  and ?̃?𝑘
2, the likelihood function (4.15) and (4.16) can be calculated and the conditional 
probabilities of each hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) and 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) can be found by submitting the 
likelihood function (4.15) and (4.16) to (2.15) separately and by setting up both the initial 
probability 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌0) = 0.5 and 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌0) = 0.5 when 𝑘 = 0, the conditional probabilities 
of each hypothesis can be shown as Fig 4.12, note that the intrusion happens at shiftpoint 
𝑘 = 250 
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Figure 4.12: Conditional probabilities of each hypothesis 𝒑(𝜽𝟏|𝒀𝒌) (unhacked case) 
and 𝒑(𝜽𝟐|𝒀𝒌) (hacked case) when there is a step and ramp-type intrusion signal 
enters the second-order system at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎, starting with each initial 
probability 𝒑(𝜽𝟏|𝒀𝟎) = 𝟎. 𝟓 and 𝒑(𝜽𝟐|𝒀𝟎) = 𝟎. 𝟓 
 
 
From Fig 4.12, it can be noticed that both the hacked and unhacked cases are all 
start with the initial probability 𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝑌0) = 0.5. The conditional probability for the 
unhacked case 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) convergences to 1 very quickly and keeps convergence until the 
shiftpoint 𝑘 = 250, and on the other hand, the conditional probability for the hacked case 
𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) convergences to 0 very quickly and keeps convergence until the shiftpoint 𝑘 =
250, which means that the system is not under attack when 𝑘 < 250. When the shiftpoint 
𝑘 = 250, the system measurement is replaced by the constant-type intrusion signal and 
the conditional probability for the unhacked case 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) convergences from 1 to 0 very 
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fast and keeps convergence when the shiftpoint 𝑘 > 250, and on the other hand, the 
conditional probability for the hacked case 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) convergences from 0 to 1 very fast 
and also keeps convergence, which means the system is now under attack when 𝑘 > 250.  
Note that the convergence time for 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) = 1 when 𝑘 < 250 is 𝑘 = 5, and the 
convergence time for 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) = 1 when 𝑘 > 250 is 𝑘 = 255, which shows this 
estimation algorithm could also work for the second-order system when there is a step 
and ramp-type intrusion enters the system. 
 
4.5 Analysis of Simulation Results  
 
 
 
Considering the four cases mentioned above, the algorithm using a bank of 
Kalman filters in this thesis can detect the intrusion signal when it enters the system 
measurement based on the intrusion model considered. For example, when a constant-
type signal enters the second-order system mentioned in section 4.3, The conditional 
probability for the hypothesis 1, which is the unhacked case 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘), convergences to 1 
very quickly and keeps convergence until the shiftpoint 𝑘 = 250 when there is no 
intrusion signal enters the system, note that the convergence time for 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) = 1 is 
𝑘 = 3 and the probability for the hacked case 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) = 0 . When 𝑘 > 250, the 
probability of the hacked hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) convergences from 0 to 1 with the 
convergence time 𝑘 = 264. Note that the shorter convergence time the better it will be, 
especially for the convergence time when the hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) (hacking happens) 
convergences from 0 to 1. Since the different signal to noise ratios could influence the 
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convergence time, it is necessary to do some analysis between the system signal to noise 
ratio (SNR) and the convergence time. Here, the SNR is given as below 
 
SNR = 
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑡𝑟(𝑋∞)
𝑊
(4.22) 
Where  
𝑋∞ = 𝐴𝑋∞𝐴
𝑇 + 𝐹𝑉𝐹𝑇 
 
From (4.22) it can be found that the system SNR increases by increasing the value of 
system state noise covariance 𝑉 or decreasing the value of 𝑊. Here, Table 4.1 shows the 
changes of the convergence time for unhacked case for 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) to converge to one 
before the intrusion happens as a function of time the covariance of the system state noise 
𝑉. 
 
Table 4.1: Changes of the convergence time for the second-order system with 
constant-type intrusion signal when increasing the SNR from 3 to 30 
V 𝑊 SNR Convergence Time 
0.1 1 2.8352 3 
0.5 1 14.1762 3 
1 1 28.3525 4 
2 1 56.7050 5 
3 1 85.0575 5 
4 1 113.4100 5 
5 1 141.7625 5 
 
From Table 4.1, it can be noted that the changes of the system state noise can barely 
influence the convergence time for the probability of the hypothesis for 𝑝(𝜃1|𝑌𝑘) 
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converge to one before the intrusion happens. While if the system output is replaced by 
the intrusion signal, the SNR is presented as below 
  
SNR =  
𝑑2
𝑊
(4.23) 
 
where 𝑑 is the intrusion signal and in section 4.3 𝑑 =  ℎ𝑘 = ℎ𝑘+1 which is a constant-
type intrusion signal and it could be noticed that the value of 𝑑 could influence the value 
of SNR from (4.23). Here, Table 4.2 shows the changes of the convergence time of the 
hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃2|𝑌𝑘) to one after the intrusion happens as a function of time the SNR 
from 3 to 30. 
 
Table 4.2: Changes of the convergence time for the second-order system with 
constant-type intrusion signal when increasing the SNR from 3 to 30 
d 𝑊 SNR Convergence Time 
3 1 9 369 
5 1 25 278 
10 1 100 266 
15 1 225 257 
20 1 400 254 
25 1 625 254 
30 1 900 254 
 
From Table 4.2, it can be noted that increasing the SNR of the system can lead to a 
shorter detection time of intrusion. This might imply that might because the larger SNR 
could lead to the bank of Kalman filters working faster. However, it is necessary to do 
some study regarding the relationship between the SNR and the convergence time.  
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4.6 An Alternative Detection Algorithm for the Intrusion Problem 
 
In this section, an alternative detection method is where the computed throretical 
mean value of the system measurement is compared to the actual value of the 
measurement. 
 
Consider the first-order system  
 
𝑥𝑘+1 =  0.9𝑥𝑘 + 𝑣𝑘 (4.24𝑎) 
 
𝑦𝑘
1 =  3𝑥𝑘  + 𝑤𝑘 (4.24𝑏) 
 
where A = 0.9,  B = 0, C = 3, D = 0, F = 1, G = 1, and the covariance of the system 
state noise 𝑉 = 0.01, the covariance of the system measurement noise 𝑊 = 0.01 and 
both system state noise and system measurement noises are aero mean and Gaussian. 
Note that this system’s eigenvalue is inside the unit circle and the superscript 1 represents 
the system is currently not under attack. After the shiftppoint 𝑘 = 100, there is a 
constant-type intrusion signal ℎ𝑘 = ℎ𝑘+1 enters the system and replaces the system 
measurement and in this case, the system measurement becomes  
 
𝑦𝑘
2 = ℎ𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘 (4.25) 
 
and the system state and measurement could be shown as Fig 4.13  
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Figure 4.13: The first-order Discrete-Time stochastic system state 𝒙𝒌 and 
measurement 𝒚𝒌 with its initial state  𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 and the Constant-Type sensor 
intrusion 𝒉𝒌 = 𝟐 happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎. 
 
The sample mean value of the system measurement ?̅?𝑘 can be approximately 
found using the sample mean method by setting up the initial state’s mean value ?̅?0. If 
there is a control signal 𝑢𝑘, then we have  
 
?̅?𝑘 = 𝐶𝐴
𝑘?̅?0 + 𝐶 ∑ 𝐴
𝑘−𝑖−1𝐵𝑢𝑖
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
(4.26) 
 
Since there is no control signal in this system, (4.26) could be simplified as below 
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?̅?𝑘 = 𝐶𝐴
𝑘?̅?0 (4.27) 
 
And the sample mean value of the system measurement could be shown as Fig 4.14. 
 
Figure 4.14: The first-order Discrete-Time stochastic system sample mean value of 
the system measurement ?̅?𝒌 with its initial mean value of the system state  ?̅?𝟎 = 𝟐 
and the Constant-Type sensor intrusion signal 𝒉𝒌 = 𝟐 happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 =
𝟏𝟎𝟎. 
  
 
After calculating the sample mean value of the system measurement ?̅?𝑘, the 
sample mean detection algorithm can be expressed as Fig 4.15 
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As mentioned in Fig 4.15, there is a comparison between the system measurement 
and the theoretical sample mean value of the system measurement, and it is defined as 
?̃?𝑘 = 𝑦𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘. Before the intrusion enters the system, the value of ?̃?𝑘 should be close to 
zero because the value of ?̅?𝑘 is the computed mean value of 𝑦𝑘 at each time step k. After 
the intrusion signal ℎ𝑘 enters the system and replaces the system measurement, the 
comparison becomes ?̃?𝑘 = ℎ𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘, which would not be close to zero because ?̅?𝑘 is no 
longer the intrusion signal’s mean value. Fig 4.16 shows the value of ?̃?𝑘 when the 
constant-type intrusion signal ℎ𝑘 enters the system at the shiftpiont 𝑘 = 100. 
 
 
  
ℎ𝑘  
Compare ?̅?𝑘 
and system 
measurement 
 
Discrete-time 
stochastic system  
System 
input 
sensor 
Sample 
mean 
method 
?̅?0 
Intrusion signal ℎ𝑘 
𝑦𝑘 
?̅?𝑘 
System is 
affected 
or not 
Figure 4.15: Flowchart of the sample mean detection algorithm 
102 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.16: The value of ?̃?𝒌 when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion 𝒉𝒌 = 𝟐 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎. 
 
From Fig 4.16, changes of ?̃?𝑘 show that there is a constant-type intrusion signal 
ℎ𝑘 enters the system at shiftpoint 𝑘 = 100 and changes the system measurement.  
 
Consider the first-order system with a control signal 𝑢𝑘  
 
𝑥𝑘+1 =  0.9𝑥𝑘 +  𝑢𝑘 + 𝑣𝑘 (4.28𝑎) 
 
𝑦𝑘
1 =  2𝑥𝑘  +  𝑢𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘 (4.28𝑏) 
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where A = 0.9,  B = 0, C = 2, D = 0, F = 1, G = 1, the constant-type control signal 
𝑢𝑘 = 1, and the covariance of the system state noise 𝑉 = 0.01, the covariance of the 
system measurement noise 𝑊 = 0.01 and both system state noise and system 
measurement noises are zero mean and Gaussian. Note that this system’s eigenvalue is 
inside the unit circle and the superscript 1 represents the system is currently not under 
attack. Similarly, after the shiftppoint 𝑘 = 100, there is a constant-type intrusion signal 
ℎ𝑘 = ℎ𝑘+1 enters the system and replaces the system measurement and in this case, the 
system measurement becomes  
 
𝑦𝑘
2 = ℎ𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘 (4.29) 
 
and the system state and measurement are shown as Fig 4.17.  
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Figure 4.17: The first-order Discrete-Time stochastic system with a constant-type 
control signal 𝒖𝐤 = 𝟏, where its state 𝒙𝒌 and measurement 𝒚𝒌 with its initial state  
𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 and the Constant-Type sensor intrusion 𝒉𝒌 = 𝟐 happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 =
𝟏𝟎𝟎. 
 
Similarly, the throretical mean value of the system measurement ?̅?𝑘 can be found 
using the sample mean method using (4.26) by setting up the system’s initial state mean 
value ?̅?0 and the control signal 𝑢𝑘. Knowing that 𝑢𝑘 is a constant control signal where 
𝑢𝑘 = 1, (4.26) can be simplified as below  
 
?̅?𝑘 = 𝐶 (𝐴
𝑘?̅?0 + ∑ 𝐴
𝑘−𝑖−1𝐵
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
) +  1 (4.30) 
 
and the theoretical mean value of the system measurement is shown as Fig 4.18 
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Figure 4.18: The first-order Discrete-Time stochastic system with a constant contorl 
signal 𝒖𝒌 = 𝟏, where its theoretical sample mean value of the system measurement 
?̅?𝒌 with its initial mean value of the system state  ?̅?𝟎 = 𝟐 and the Constant-Type 
sensor intrusion signal 𝒉𝒌 = 𝟐 happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎. 
 
Similarly, using the algorithm mentioned in Fig 4.15, there is a comparison 
between the system measurement and the theoretical sample mean value of the system 
measurement, and it is defined as ?̃?𝑘 = 𝑦𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘. Before the intrusion enters the system, 
the value of ?̃?𝑘 should be close to zero because the value of ?̅?𝑘 is the mean value of 𝑦𝑘 at 
each time step k. After the intrusion signal ℎ𝑘 enters the system and replaces the system 
measurement, the comparision becomes ?̃?𝑘 = ℎ𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘, which would not be close to zero 
because ?̅?𝑘 is no longer the intrusion signal’s mean value. Fig 4.19 shows the value of ?̃?𝑘 
when the constant-type intrusion signal ℎ𝑘 enters the system at the shiftpiont 𝑘 = 100. 
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Figure 4.19: The value of ?̃?𝒌 when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion 𝒉𝒌 = 𝟐 
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎. 
 
From Fig 4.19, changes of ?̃?𝑘 could show that there is a constant-type intrusion 
signal ℎ𝑘 enters the system at shiftpoint 𝑘 = 100 and changes the system measurement.  
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5 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
5.1 Summary 
 
In this thesis, an estimation algorithm based on a bank of Kalman Filters was 
designed that is capable of detecting sensor intrusion problem in industrial control 
systems. It is shown that when a hacker replaces the system measurement by different 
types of the intrusion signals, the estimation algorithm designed in this thesis can detect 
the changes of the system measurement by calculating the system state and measurement 
estimates based on different intrusion possibilities. This was achieved by designing a 
bank of Kalman filters together with calculating the probabilities of different hypotheses 
on the system measurements. To set up the bank of Kalman filters, it is necessary to 
know the system’s state and measurement equations. Step and ramp types of intrusion 
signals either partially or totally replace the measurement signal at a certain time point so 
that the system measurement does not give information about the system state. Thus, a 
bank of Kalman filters was implemented, to calculate the system measurement with and 
without the measurement being replaced by the intrusion signal. 
 
After receiving the system measurement, the probabilities of each hypothesis 
(unhacked and hacked with step or ramp) can be calculated using the Bayesian 
Estimation algorithm. As mentioned in chapter 2, the initial probabilities for the hacked 
and unhacked cases both need to be assumed so that the algorithm could be initialized. 
After setting the initial probabilities for both assumptions, the probabilities can be 
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calculated recursively with the given system measurement data. The convergence time 
for the probabilities converging to one was measured and this was used as the speed 
criterion of the estimation method. This performance of the algorithm was also tested 
using different measurement signal to noise ratios.  
 
A simpler estimation method, which is called the sample mean method, was also 
implemented for the same system when there is a step-type intrusion signal replacing the 
measurement. Since the system state and measurement mean value can be calculated 
using this technique, the residual between the actual value of the measurement and the 
theoretical mean value of the system measurement can be found and this can be used to 
detect if there’s an intrusion signal. When there is no intrusion signal, the residual should 
be close to zero because the theoretical mean value of the system measurement should be 
close enough to the actual value of the system measurement. If the measurement is 
replaced by the intrusion signal, the residual would be relatively larger, and the intrusion 
signal can be detected. 
 
5.2 Conclusions 
 
The estimation algorithms implemented in this thesis were applied to two 
different systems, a first-order system and a second-order system, with an additive white 
noise component in the measurement. Two different type of intrusion signals are 
considered, step and ramp replacing partially or totally the signal component of the 
measurement in our attack model.   
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In our scenarios, first, a first-order system was attacked by the step-type intrusion 
signal, replacing the measurement by that intrusion signal. The simulations showed that 
the intrusion was detected and the probability of each hypothesis (hypotheses 1: no 
intrusion, hypoehtses 2: most of the signal component of intrusion) was calculated as 
expected. Then, we focused on the step and ramp-type intrusion on the same first-order 
system and after simulating the attack using step and ramp-type intrusion signal on the 
first-order system, the result was also positive.  
 
Next, the constant-type and the step and ramp-type intrusion targeting the second-
order system were also simulated. Similarly, the intrusion signal replaced modt of the 
signal component of the system measurement by the intrusion signal at a certain time 
point. For both cases, the simulations showed the attack can be detected and the 
probability of each hypothesis was calculated and converged to correct values sufficiently 
fast. 
 
Furthermore, a short study on how the signal to noise ratio influences the speed 
performance of the algorithm was also done, and this short study shows the behavior 
effect of large signal to noise ratios on the speed of detection of the algorithm.  
 
Lastly, a new estimation method, which is named the sample mean method, was 
developed to detect the sensor intrusions when the intrusion signal replaces the 
measurement. Using this sample mean technique, the theoretical sample mean value of 
the system state and measurement can be calculated in time and by forming the residual 
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between the system actual measurement and theoretical value of its sample mean, the 
intrusion can be effectively detected. 
 
5.3 Future Work 
 
This work brings out new ideas in the detection of sensor intrusion using 
estimation theory. The main objective of this work was to achieve a successful detection 
of certain types of the sensor intrusion targeting the industrial control systems, where two 
types of the intrusion signal were tested in this work. Other types of intrusion signals can 
be applied to control systems and the performance of these estimation algorithms can be 
tested. 
 
The main technique developed in this work using a bank of Kalman filters only 
applied to first order and second order linear, time-invariant systems with additive white 
noise, that is of zero mean and Gaussian distributed, but can be applied to nonlinear (e.g. 
with estended Kalman filters), time-varying systems of larger order affected by noises 
with various other characteristics.  
 
Furthermore, the extension of this work only used sample mean technique for the 
first order system with constant-type intrusion and step and ramp-type intrusion and this 
technique can also be applied to higher order systems.  
 
Also, the relationship between the signal noise to ratio and the speed of the first 
detection algorithm was only studied briefly. This relationship might be analyzed further 
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to be able to find optimal signal to noise ratios for the best performance of these intrusion 
detection estimation algorithms. 
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APPENDIX: MATLAB CODES 
 
The MATLAB codes used to implement the bank of Kalman filters algorithm and 
the Sample Mean algorithm in this thesis are given in this Appendix. 
 
1 MATLAB Code for the First-Order Discrete-Time system 
 
%% 
% Author: Jiayi Su 
%% 
% Description: MATLAB Code for the First-Order Discrete-Time system 
  
%% Cleaning  
clear all 
close all 
clc 
  
%% Systen matrices for the First-Order system 
A = 0.9; 
B = 0; 
C  = 1; 
D = 0; 
F = 1; 
G = 1; 
  
kmax = 200; % Set up the time step kmax 
  
x= zeros(1,kmax); % Create an x vector of length kmax and fill it with 0s 
y = zeros(kmax,1); % Create an y vector of width kmax and fill it with 0s 
  
vd = 0.1; % Set up the covariance of the system state noise 
wd = 0.05; % Set up the covariance of the system measurement noise 
  
%% Creating the noise for system state and measurement, which are distrubuted as 
Gaussian  
V=sqrt(vd)*randn(1,kmax); 
V1 = mean(V); 
V2 = V-V1; 
  
W=sqrt(wd)*randn(1,kmax); 
W1 = mean(W); 
W2 = W-W1; 
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%% Initial value of system state 
x(1) = 2; 
  
%% Simulating the system with its initial value for kmax times 
for k = 1:kmax 
     
        x(k+1) = A*x(k)+F*V2(k); 
        y(k) = C*x(:,k)+G*W2(k);  
         
end 
  
%% Plot of results 
figure, 
plot(x) % Plot of the system state  
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('System State x') 
legend('x') 
  
figure, 
plot(y) % Plot of the system measurement  
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('System Measurement y') 
legend('y') 
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2 MATLAB Code for the First-Order system with the Constant-Type intrusion 
signal enters the system. 
 
%% 
% Author: Jiayi Su 
%% 
% Description: MATLAB Code for the First-Order Discrete-Time system with the 
%constant-type intrusion signal enters the system  
%% Cleaning  
clear all 
close all 
clc 
%% Systen matrices for the First-Order system 
A = 0.9; 
B = 0; 
C  = 1; 
D = 0; 
F = 1; 
G = 1; 
  
kmax = 200; % Set up the time step kmax 
  
x1= zeros(1,kmax); % Create an x vector of length kmax and fill it with 0s 
y = zeros(kmax,1); % Create an y vector of width kmax and fill it with 0s 
  
vd = 0.1; % Set up the covariance of the system state noise 
wd = 0.05; % Set up the covariance of the system measurement noise 
  
%% Creating the noise for system state and measurement, which are distrubuted as 
Gaussian  
V=sqrt(vd)*randn(1,kmax); 
V1 = mean(V); 
V2 = V-V1; 
  
W=sqrt(wd)*randn(1,kmax); 
W1 = mean(W); 
W2 = W-W1; 
  
%% Initial value of system state 
x1(1) = 2; 
  
  
%% Attack model when the constant-type intrusion signal enters the system 
A2 = [A 0; 0 1]; 
B2 = B; 
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C2 = [0.05 C]; 
D2 = D; 
F2 = [F 0]';    
     
OBSERVABILITY = obsv(A2,C2) % Checking the system observability  
     
ShiftPoint = 100; % Set up the shiftpoint where the intrusion signal enters the system 
%randi([80 120],1,1); % The shiftpoint can be select arbitrary using this function  
       
  
p1(:,:,1)=100; % Set pup the initial value of the unhacked system error covariance P1 
xhat1(:,1)=1; % Set up the initial unhacked estimated state x1_0_hat 
  
p2(:,:,1) = p1(:,:,1)*eye(2); % Set pup the initial value of the hacked system error 
covariance P2 
xhat2(:,1) = [0,0]'; % Set up the initial hacked estimated state x2_0_hat 
  
t = 1:kmax+1; % Set up the total time step for the system 
  
ip = 0.5;   % Set up the initial probability for the unhacked hypothesis 
  
% Set up the space vector the storing the probability of the two hypothesis 
pThetaZk1 = [ip NaN(1,length(t)-1)]; 
pThetaZk2 = [1-ip NaN(1,length(t)-1)]; 
  
%% Bank of Kalman Filter scheme 
for k=1:kmax 
           
    if k< ShiftPoint 
         
        x1(k+1) = A*x1(k)+F*V2(k); 
        y(k) = C*x1(:,k)+G*W2(k);  
                         
    else 
         
        h(k) = 10; % Intrusion signal enters the system 
         
        x2(:,k+1) = A2*[x1(k) h(k)]' + F2*V2(k); 
        y(k) = C2*x2(:,k) + G*W2(k); 
         
    end     
         
        % Estimator  
        p1(:,:,k+1)=A*p1(:,:,k)*A' - 
(A*p1(:,:,k)*C'*C*p1(:,:,k)*A')/(C*p1(:,:,k)*C'+wd)+vd; % Error covariance update   
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        Kk1(:,k)=(A*p1(:,:,k)*C')/(C*p1(:,:,k)*C'+G*wd*G'); % Kalman Gain update 
                 
        xhat1(:,k+1)=A*xhat1(:,k)+Kk1(:,k)*(y(k)-C*xhat1(:,k)); % State update 
         
         
        p2(:,:,k+1)=A2*p2(:,:,k)*A2'-
(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'*C2*p2(:,:,k)*A2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+wd)+vd;  % Error covariance 
update  
         
        Kk2(:,k)=(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+G*wd*G');% Kalman Gain update 
                 
        xhat2(:,k+1)=A2*xhat2(:,k)+Kk2(:,k)*(y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k));% State update 
         
       % Calculating the covariance for each Kalman Filter with its 
       % corresponding hypothesis omega in time 
       omega_k_1(k) = C * p1(:,:,k+1) * C' + G*wd*G'; 
        
       omega_k_2(k) = C2 * p2(:,:,k+1) * C2' + G*wd*G';    
        
       % Calculating the system measurement estimate y_hat and the system 
       % innovation term y_tilde in time  
       yhat1(k) = C*xhat1(:,k); 
         
       y_tilde1(k)=y(k)-C*xhat1(:,k); 
        
       yhat2(k) = C2*xhat2(:,k); 
        
       y_tilde2(k)=y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k);     
        
       % Likelihood function of each hypothesis  
       pzkTheta1 = (2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(omega_k_1(k)))... 
        *exp(-0.5*y_tilde1(k)'*eye/omega_k_1(k)*y_tilde1(k)); 
     
       pzkTheta2 = (2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(omega_k_2(k)))... 
        *exp(-0.5*y_tilde2(k)'*eye/omega_k_2(k)*y_tilde2(k)); 
     
     
    % Weight update equations  
    denom = pzkTheta1*pThetaZk1(k) + pzkTheta2*pThetaZk2(k); 
     
    % Conditional probability for each hypothesis 
    pThetaZk1(k+1) = pzkTheta1*pThetaZk1(k)/denom; 
    pThetaZk2(k+1) = pzkTheta2*pThetaZk2(k)/denom;     
    
end 
% Plot of results 
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figure, 
plot(y) % System ture output 
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('System Measurement y') 
legend('y') 
  
  
tt = 1:kmax; 
figure, 
plot(tt,y_tilde1,tt,y_tilde2) % System innovation terms for both hypothesis  
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('y tilde') 
legend('y tilde1 = y - yhat1','y tilde2 = y - yhat2') 
grid on   
  
figure, 
plot(t,pThetaZk1,'b',t,pThetaZk2,'r') % Conditional probability for each hypothesis  
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('Probability') 
legend('unhacked system','hacked system') 
grid on 
  
%% Convergence time for the conditional probability goes to 1 
thresh = 0.99; 
convergenceIndex = [find(pThetaZk1 > thresh,1);find(pThetaZk2 > thresh,1)]; 
disp('Convergence time:') 
t(convergenceIndex) 
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3 MATLAB Code for First-Order system with the step and ramp-type intrusion 
signal enters the system. 
 
%% 
% Author: Jiayi Su 
%% 
% Description: MATLAB Code for the First-Order Discrete-Time system with Ramp-
%Type intrusion siganl  
  
%% Cleaning 
clear all 
close all 
clc 
%% Systen matrices for the First-Order system 
A = 0.9; 
B = 0; 
C  = 1; 
D = 0; 
F = 1; 
G = 1; 
  
kmax = 200; % Set up the time step kmax 
  
x1= zeros(1,kmax); % Create an x vector of length kmax and fill it with 0s 
y = zeros(kmax,1); % Create an y vector of width kmax and fill it with 0s 
  
vd = 0.1; % Set up the covariance of the system state noise 
wd = 0.05; % Set up the covariance of the system measurement noise 
  
%% Creating the noise for system state and measurement, which are distrubuted as 
Gaussian  
V=sqrt(vd)*randn(1,kmax); 
V1 = mean(V); 
V2 = V-V1; 
  
W=sqrt(wd)*randn(1,kmax); 
W1 = mean(W); 
W2 = W-W1; 
  
%% Initial value of system state 
x1(1) = 2; 
  
%% Attack model when the step and ramp-type intrusion signal enters the system 
    H = [1 1; 0 1]; 
    A2 = [A 0 0; 0 H(1,:); 0 H(2,:)]; 
    B2 = B; 
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    C2 = [0.05 1 1]; 
    D2 = D; 
    F2 = [F 0 0]';  
  
    OBSERVABILITY = obsv(A2,C2) % Check the observability for the attack model  
    RANK_OBSV_MODEL_2 = rank(OBSERVABILITY) 
     
    ShiftPoint = 100; % Set up the shiftpoint where the intrusion signal enters the system 
    %randi([80 120],1,1); % The shiftpoint can be select arbitrary between 80 and 120 
using this function  
     
p1(:,:,1)=100; % Set up the initial value of the unhacked system error covariance P1 
xhat1(:,1)=1; % Set up the initial unhacked estimated state x1_0_hat 
  
p2(:,:,1) = 7*eye(3); % Set up the initial value of the hacked system error covariance P2 
xhat2(:,1) = [0.1,0,0]'; % Set up the initial estimated state x2_0_hat for the attack model 
  
t = 1:kmax+1; 
  
ip = 0.5;   %initial probability for the unhacked hypothesis 
  
% Set up the space vector for storing the probability of the two hypothesis 
pThetaZk1 = [ip NaN(1,length(t)-1)]; 
pThetaZk2 = [1-ip NaN(1,length(t)-1)]; 
  
%% Bank of Kalman Filter scheme 
for k=1:kmax 
     
        % set up the step and ramp-type intrusion signal 
        h(:,1) = [1 0.1]'; 
        h(:,k+1) = H*h(:,k);  
     
    if k< ShiftPoint 
         
        x1(k+1) = A*x1(k)+F*V2(k); 
        y(k) = C*x1(:,k)+G*W2(k);  
                 
    else 
         
        % Intrusion signal enters the system 
        x2(:,k+1) = A2*[x1(k); h(:,k)] + F2*V2(k); 
        y(k) = C2*x2(:,k) + G*W2(k); 
         
    end     
         
        % Estimator  
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        p1(:,:,k+1)=A*p1(:,:,k)*A'-
(A*p1(:,:,k)*C'*C*p1(:,:,k)*A')/(C*p1(:,:,k)*C'+wd)+vd; % Error covariance  update  
         
        Kk1(:,k)=(A*p1(:,:,k)*C')/(C*p1(:,:,k)*C'+G*wd*G'); % Kalman Gain update 
                 
        xhat1(:,k+1)=A*xhat1(:,k)+Kk1(:,k)*(y(k)-C*xhat1(:,k)); % Estimated state update  
         
         
        p2(:,:,k+1)=A2*p2(:,:,k)*A2'-
(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'*C2*p2(:,:,k)*A2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+wd)+vd;  % Error covariance  
update  
         
        Kk2(:,k)=(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+G*wd*G'); % Kalman Gain update 
                 
        xhat2(:,k+1)=A2*xhat2(:,k)+Kk2(:,k)*(y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k)); % Estimated state 
update  
         
       % Calculating the covariance for each Kalman Filter with its 
       % corresponding hypothesis omega in time     
       omega_k_1(k) = C * p1(:,:,k+1) * C' + G*wd*G'; 
        
       omega_k_2(k) = C2 * p2(:,:,k+1) * C2' + G*wd*G';    
        
       % Calculating the system measurement estimate y_hat and the system 
       % innovation term y_tilde in time  
       y_tilde1(k)=y(k)-C*xhat1(:,k); 
         
       y_tilde2(k)=y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k);     
        
       % Likelihood function of each hypothesis         
       pzkTheta1 = (2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(omega_k_1(k)))... 
        *exp(-0.5*y_tilde1(k)'*eye/omega_k_1(k)*y_tilde1(k)); 
     
       pzkTheta2 = (2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(omega_k_2(k)))... 
        *exp(-0.5*y_tilde2(k)'*eye/omega_k_2(k)*y_tilde2(k)); 
    
    % Weight update equations      
    denom = pzkTheta1*pThetaZk1(k) + pzkTheta2*pThetaZk2(k); 
  
    % Conditional probability for each hypothesis 
    pThetaZk1(k+1) = pzkTheta1*pThetaZk1(k)/denom; 
    pThetaZk2(k+1) = pzkTheta2*pThetaZk2(k)/denom;     
     
end 
  
% Plot of results 
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figure, 
plot(y) % System ture output 
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('System Measurement y') 
legend('y') 
  
tt = 1:kmax; 
figure, 
plot(tt,y_tilde1,tt,y_tilde2) % System innovation terms for both hypothesis  
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('y tilde') 
legend('y tilde1 = y - yhat1','y tilde2 = y - yhat2') 
grid on   
  
figure, 
plot(t,pThetaZk1,'b',t,pThetaZk2,'r') % Conditional probability for each hypothesis  
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('Probability') 
legend('unhacked system','hacked system') 
grid on 
  
%% Convergence time for the conditional probability goes to 1 
thresh = 0.99; 
convergenceIndex = [find(pThetaZk1 > thresh,1);find(pThetaZk2 > thresh,1)]; 
disp('Convergence time:') 
t(convergenceIndex) 
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4 MATLAB Code for the second-order discrete-time system  
 
 
%% 
% Author: Jiayi Su 
%% 
% Description: MATLAB Code for modeling the Second-Order Discrete-Time system 
  
%% Cleaning  
clear all 
close all 
clc 
%% 
% Second-order Discrete-Time model 
A1 = [0 0.9; -1 -1]; 
F1 = [1 0]'; 
C1 = [1 1]; 
G1 = 1; 
  
EIGENVALUE_SYS_1 = eig(A1) % Check the system stability 
OBSERVABILITY_SYS_1 = obsv(A1,C1) % check the system observability 
RANK_OBSV_SYS_1 = rank(OBSERVABILITY_SYS_1) 
  
kmax = 200; 
  
% Error covariance for the systen state noise and measuremnt noise  
vd = 1; 
wd = 1; 
  
%% Creating the noise for system state and measurement, which are distrubuted as 
Gaussian  
V1=sqrt(vd)*randn(1,kmax); 
V2 = mean(V1); 
V = V1-V2; 
  
W1=sqrt(wd)*randn(1,kmax); 
W2 = mean(W1); 
W = W1-W2; 
  
x1 = zeros(2,kmax); % Create an x1 vector of length kmax, width 2 and fill it with 0s 
y = zeros(1,kmax); % Create an y vector of width kmax and fill it with 0s 
  
% Set up the initial value for the second-order system 
x1(:,1) = [2,2]'; 
  
%% Simulating the system with its initial value for kmax times 
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for k = 1:kmax 
             
        x1(:,k+1) = A1*x1(:,k) + F1*V(k); 
        y(k) = C1*x1(:,k) + G1*W(k); 
           
end 
  
%% Plot of results 
figure, 
plot(x1(1,:)) % Plot of the system first state  
legend('x1') 
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('System State x_1') 
  
figure, 
plot(x1(2,:)) % Plot of the system second state  
legend('x2') 
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('System State x_2') 
  
figure, 
plot(y) % Plot of the system measurement  
legend('y') 
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('System Measurement y') 
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5 MATLAB Code for the second-order discrete-time system with constant-type 
intrusion signal 
 
%% 
% Author: Jiayi Su 
%% 
% Description: MATLAB Code for the Second-Order Discrete-Time system with 
% Constant-Type intrusion signal 
  
%% Cleaning  
clear all 
close all 
clc 
%% Systen matrices for the Second-Order system 
A1 = [0 0.9; -1 -1]; 
F1 = [1 0]'; 
C1 = [1 1]; 
G1 = 1; 
  
EIGENVALUE_SYS_1 = eig(A1) % Check the system eigenvalue for the system 
stability 
OBSERVABILITY_SYS_1 = obsv(A1,C1) % Check the system observability 
RANK_OBSV_SYS_1 = rank(OBSERVABILITY_SYS_1) 
  
kmax = 500; % Set up the time step kmax 
  
vd = 1; % Set up the covariance of the system state noise 
wd = 1; % Set up the covariance of the system measurement noise 
  
%% Creating the noise for system state and measurement, which are distrubuted as 
Gaussian  
V1=sqrt(vd)*randn(1,kmax); 
V2 = mean(V1); 
V = V1-V2; 
  
W1=sqrt(wd)*randn(1,kmax); 
W2 = mean(W1); 
W = W1-W2; 
  
x1 = zeros(2,kmax); 
y = zeros(1,kmax); 
  
%% Initial value of system state 
x1(:,1) = [2,2]'; 
  
%% Attack model when the constant-type intrusion signal enters the system 
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A2 = [A1(1,:)  0; A1(2,:)  0; 0 0 1 ]; 
F2 = [F1' 0]'; 
C2 = [0 0.1 1]; 
G2 = G1; 
  
EIGENVALUE_SYS_2 = eig(A2) % Check the eigenvalue for the attack model for the 
system stability 
OBSERVABILITY_ATTACK_MODEL = obsv(A2,C2) % Check the observability for 
the attack model 
RANK_OBSV_ATTACK_MODEL = rank(OBSERVABILITY_ATTACK_MODEL) 
  
p1(:,:,1) = 100*eye(2); % Set up the initial value of the unhacked system error covariance 
P1 
xhat1(:,1) = [0 0]'; % Set up the initial unhacked estimated state x1_0_hat 
  
p2(:,:,1) = 100*eye(3); % Set up the initial value of the hacked system error covariance 
P2 
xhat2(:,1) = [0 0 0]'; % Set up the initial hacked estimated state x2_0_hat 
  
t = 1:kmax+1; 
  
ip = 0.5;   % Set up the initial probability for the unhacked system 
  
% Set up the space vector the storing the probability of the two hypothesis 
pThetaZk1 = [ip NaN(1,length(t)-1)]; 
pThetaZk2 = [1-ip NaN(1,length(t)-1)]; 
  
ShiftPoint = 250;% Set up the shiftpoint where the intrusion signal enters the system 
%randi([200 300],1,1); % The shiftpoint can be select arbitrary between 200 and 300 
using this function  
  
% Bank of Kalman Filter scheme 
for k = 1:kmax 
     
         
    if k< ShiftPoint 
         
        x1(:,k+1) = A1*x1(:,k) + F1 *V(k); 
        y(k) = C1*x1(:,k) + G1*W(k); 
         
    else 
         
        h(k) = 20;% the constant-type intrusion signal enters the system 
        x2(:,k+1) = A2*[x1(:,k); h(k)] + F2 *V(k); 
        y(k) = C2*x2(:,k) + G2*W(k); 
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    end  
     
        % Estimator  
        p1(:,:,k+1)=A1*p1(:,:,k)*A1'-
(A1*p1(:,:,k)*C1'*C1*p1(:,:,k)*A1')/(C1*p1(:,:,k)*C1'+wd)+vd; % Error covariance 
update    
         
        Kk1(:,k)=(A1*p1(:,:,k)*C1')/(C1*p1(:,:,k)*C1'+G1*wd*G1'); % Kalman Gain 
update 
                 
        xhat1(:,k+1)=A1*xhat1(:,k)+Kk1(:,k)*(y(k)-C1*xhat1(:,k)); % State update 
         
         
        p2(:,:,k+1)=A2*p2(:,:,k)*A2'-
(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'*C2*p2(:,:,k)*A2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+wd)+vd; % Error covariance 
update    
         
        Kk2(:,k)=(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+G2*wd*G2'); % Kalman Gain 
update 
                 
        xhat2(:,k+1)=A2*xhat2(:,k)+Kk2(:,k)*(y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k)); % State update 
         
       % Calculating the covariance for each Kalman Filter with its 
       % corresponding hypothesis omega in time 
       omega_k_1(k) = C1 * p1(:,:,k+1) * C1' + G1*wd*G1'; 
        
       omega_k_2(k) = C2 * p2(:,:,k+1) * C2' + G2*wd*G2';    
        
       % Calculating the system innovation term in time using system true 
       % measurment and the system estimated measurement 
       y_tilde1(k)=y(k)-C1*xhat1(:,k); 
         
       y_tilde2(k)=y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k);     
        
       % Likelihood functions for each hypothesis 
       pzkTheta1 = (2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(omega_k_1(k)))... 
        *exp(-0.5*y_tilde1(k)'*eye/omega_k_1(k)*y_tilde1(k)); 
     
       pzkTheta2 = (2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(omega_k_2(k)))... 
        *exp(-0.5*y_tilde2(k)'*eye/omega_k_2(k)*y_tilde2(k)); 
      % Weight update equations  
      denom = pzkTheta1*pThetaZk1(k) + pzkTheta2*pThetaZk2(k); 
       
      % Conditional probability for each hypothesis  
      pThetaZk1(k+1) = pzkTheta1*pThetaZk1(k)/denom; 
      pThetaZk2(k+1) = pzkTheta2*pThetaZk2(k)/denom;     
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end 
  
% Calculate the system Signal Noise Ration before the system is intruded  
X = dlyap(A1,F1*vd*F1'); 
SNR = (C1*C1'*trace(X))/wd 
  
  
% Plot of the results  
figure, 
plot(y) % System true output  
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('System Measurement y') 
legend('y') 
  
  
  
tt = 1:kmax; 
figure, 
plot(tt,y_tilde1,tt,y_tilde2) % System innovation terms for each hypothesis  
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('y tilde') 
legend('y tilde1 = y - yhat1','y tilde2 = y - yhat2') 
grid on   
  
figure, 
plot(t,pThetaZk1,'b',t,pThetaZk2,'r') % Conditional probability for each hypothesis  
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('Probability') 
legend('unhacked system','hacked system') 
grid on 
  
%% Convergence time for the conditional probability goes to 1 
thresh = 0.99; 
convergenceIndex = [find(pThetaZk1 > thresh,1);find(pThetaZk2 > thresh,1)]; 
disp('Convergence time:') 
t(convergenceIndex) 
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6 MATLAB Code for the second-order discrete-time system with step and ramp-
type intrusion signal 
 
%% 
% Author: Jiayi Su 
%% 
% Description: MATLAB Code for the Second-Order Discrete-Time system with 
% Step and ramp-type intrusion signal 
  
%% Cleaning 
clear all 
close all 
clc 
%% Systen matrices for the Second-Order system 
A1 = [0 0.9; -1 -1]; 
F1 = [1 0]'; 
C1 = [1 1]; 
G1 = 1; 
  
EIGENVALUE_SYS_1 = eig(A1) % Check the system eigenvalue for the stability 
OBSERVABILITY_SYS_1 = obsv(A1,C1) % Check the system observability  
RANK_OBSV_SYS_1 = rank(OBSERVABILITY_SYS_1) 
  
kmax = 500; % Set up the time step kmax 
  
vd = 1; % Set up the covariance of the system state noise 
wd = 1; % Set up the covariance of the system measurement noise 
  
%% Creating the noise for system state and measurement, which are distrubuted as 
Gaussian  
V1=sqrt(vd)*randn(1,kmax); 
V2 = mean(V1); 
V = V1-V2; 
  
W1=sqrt(wd)*randn(1,kmax); 
W2 = mean(W1); 
W = W1-W2; 
  
x1 = zeros(2,kmax); % Create an x vector of length kmax, width 2 and fill it with 0s 
y = zeros(1,kmax); % Create an y vector of width kmax and fill it with 0s 
  
x1(:,1) = [2,2]'; % Set up the system initial state 
  
%% Attack model when the step and ramp-type intrusion signal enters the system 
H = [1 1; 0 1]; 
A2 = [A1(1,:) 0 0; A1(2,:) 0 0; 0 0 H(1,:); 0 0 H(2,:) ]; 
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F2 = [F1' 0 0]'; 
C2 = [0 0.1 1 0]; 
G2 = G1; 
  
OBSERVABILITY_ATTACK_MODEL = obsv(A2,C2)  % Check the observability for 
the attack model 
RANK_OBSV_ATTACK_MODEL = rank(OBSERVABILITY_ATTACK_MODEL) 
  
  
p1(:,:,1) = 100*eye(2); % Set up the initial value of the unhacked system error covariance 
P1 
xhat1(:,1) = [0 0]'; % Set up the initial unhacked estimated state x1_0_hat 
  
p2(:,:,1) = 100*eye(4); % Set up the initial value of the hacked system error covariance 
P2 
xhat2(:,1) = [0 0 0 0]'; % Set up the initial estimated state x2_0_hat for the attack model 
  
t = 1:kmax+1; 
  
ip = 0.5;   %initial probability for the unhacked hypothesis 
  
% Set up the space vector for storing the probability of the two hypothesis 
pThetaZk1 = [ip NaN(1,length(t)-1)]; 
pThetaZk2 = [1-ip NaN(1,length(t)-1)]; 
  
ShiftPoint = 250;% Set up the shiftpoint where the intrusion signal enters the system 
    %randi([200 300],1,1); % The shiftpoint can be select arbitrary between 200 and 300 
using this function  
  
  
%% Bank of Kalman Filter scheme 
for k = 1:kmax 
        % set up the step and ramp-type intrusion signal 
        h(:,1) = [1 0.1]'; 
        h(:,k+1) = H*h(:,k);  
         
    if k< ShiftPoint 
         
        x1(:,k+1) = A1*x1(:,k) + F1 *V(k); 
        y(k) = C1*x1(:,k) + G1*W(k); 
         
    else 
         
        % Intrusion signal enters the system 
        x2(:,k+1) = A2*[x1(:,k); h(:,k)] + F2 *V(k); 
        y(k) = C2*x2(:,k) + G2*W(k); 
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    end  
     
        % Estimator 
        p1(:,:,k+1)=A1*p1(:,:,k)*A1'-
(A1*p1(:,:,k)*C1'*C1*p1(:,:,k)*A1')/(C1*p1(:,:,k)*C1'+wd)+vd; % Error covariance  
update    
         
        Kk1(:,k)=(A1*p1(:,:,k)*C1')/(C1*p1(:,:,k)*C1'+G1*wd*G1'); % Kalman Gain 
update 
                 
        xhat1(:,k+1)=A1*xhat1(:,k)+Kk1(:,k)*(y(k)-C1*xhat1(:,k)); % State Estimate 
update  
         
         
        p2(:,:,k+1)=A2*p2(:,:,k)*A2'-
(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'*C2*p2(:,:,k)*A2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+wd)+vd; % Error covariance  
update    
         
        Kk2(:,k)=(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+G2*wd*G2'); % Kalman Gain 
update 
                 
        xhat2(:,k+1)=A2*xhat2(:,k)+Kk2(:,k)*(y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k)); % State Estimate 
update  
         
       % Calculating the covariance for each Kalman Filter with its 
       % corresponding hypothesis omega in time          
       omega_k_1(k) = C1 * p1(:,:,k+1) * C1' + G1*wd*G1'; 
        
       omega_k_2(k) = C2 * p2(:,:,k+1) * C2' + G2*wd*G2';    
        
       % Calculating the system measurement estimate y_hat and the system 
       % innovation term y_tilde in time                
       y_tilde1(k)=y(k)-C1*xhat1(:,k); 
         
       y_tilde2(k)=y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k);    
        
       % Likelihood function of each hypothesis          
       pzkTheta1 = (2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(omega_k_1(k)))... 
        *exp(-0.5*y_tilde1(k)'*eye/omega_k_1(k)*y_tilde1(k)); 
     
       pzkTheta2 = (2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(omega_k_2(k)))... 
        *exp(-0.5*y_tilde2(k)'*eye/omega_k_2(k)*y_tilde2(k)); 
       
      % Weight update equations       
      denom = pzkTheta1*pThetaZk1(k) + pzkTheta2*pThetaZk2(k); 
133 
 
 
 
       
      % Conditional probability for each hypothesis 
      pThetaZk1(k+1) = pzkTheta1*pThetaZk1(k)/denom; 
      pThetaZk2(k+1) = pzkTheta2*pThetaZk2(k)/denom;     
               
end 
  
% Plot of results 
figure, 
plot(y) % System ture output 
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('System Measurement y') 
legend('y') 
  
tt = 1:kmax; 
figure, 
plot(tt,y_tilde1,tt,y_tilde2) % System innovation terms for both hypothesis  
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('y tilde') 
legend('y tilde1 = y - yhat1','y tilde2 = y - yhat2') 
grid on   
  
figure, 
plot(t,pThetaZk1,'b',t,pThetaZk2,'r') % Conditional probability for each hypothesis  
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('Probability') 
legend('unhacked system','hacked system') 
grid on 
  
%% Convergence time for the conditional probability goes to 1 
thresh = 0.99; 
convergenceIndex = [find(pThetaZk1 > thresh,1);find(pThetaZk2 > thresh,1)]; 
disp('Convergence time:') 
t(convergenceIndex) 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
 
 
7 MATLAB Code for the Sample Mean algorithm  
 
 
%Cleaning 
clear all 
close all 
clc 
%% 
% Author: Jiayi Su 
%% 
% Description: MATLAB Code for the First-Order system without control signal with 
constant-type intrusion signal using Sample Mean algorithm  
%% Systen matrices for the First-Order system 
A = 0.9; 
B = 0; 
C  = 3; 
D = 0; 
F = 1; 
G = 1; 
  
kmax = 200; % Set up the time step kmax 
  
x= zeros(1,kmax);% Create an x vector of length kmax and fill it with 0s 
y = zeros(kmax,1);% Create an y vector of width kmax and fill it with 0s 
  
x_mean = NaN(1,kmax);% Create an x_mean vector of length kmax and fill it with 0s 
y_mean = NaN(kmax,1);% Create an y_mean vector of length kmax and fill it with 0s 
  
vd = 0.01;% Set up the covariance of the system state noise 
wd = 0.01;% Set up the covariance of the system measurement noise 
  
EIGENVALUE = eig(A) % Calculate the system eigenvalues  
%% Creating the noise for system state and measurement, which are distrubuted as 
Gaussian  
V=sqrt(vd)*randn(1,kmax); 
V1 = mean(V); 
V2 = V-V1; 
  
W=sqrt(wd)*randn(1,kmax); 
W1 = mean(W); 
W2 = W-W1; 
  
  
x(1) = 2;% Set up the system initial state 
  
shiftpoint = 100;% Set up the shiftpoint where the intrusion signal enters the system 
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%Sasmple Mean scheme 
for k = 1:kmax 
     
     x(k+1) = A*x(k)+F*V2(k); 
     d = 2; % set up the constant-tyoe intrusion signal 
    % calculating the sample mean value of the system state and system measurement  
        x_mean(k) = (A^k)*x(1); 
        y_mean(k) = C*x_mean(k); 
         
    if k<= shiftpoint 
        
        y(k) = C*x(:,k)+G*W2(k);  
         
        % Comparision between the ture measurement and the sample mean 
        % measurement 
        y_tilde(k) = y(k) - y_mean(k);        
         
    else 
        % intrusion signal enters the system 
        y(k) = d + G*W2(k);  
         
        % Comparision between the ture measurement and the sample mean 
        % measurement 
        y_tilde(k) = y(k) - y_mean(k); 
         
    end 
end 
  
  
% Plot of results 
figure, 
subplot(2,1,1) % system state 
plot(x) 
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('System State x') 
legend('x') 
subplot(2,1,2) % system measurement 
plot(y) 
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('System Measurement y') 
legend('y') 
  
  
figure, % sample mean value of the system measurement 
plot(y_mean) 
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xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('y mean') 
legend('y mean') 
  
  
figure, % residule between the system ture measurement and the system sample mean 
measurement 
plot(y_tilde) 
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('y tilde') 
legend('y tilde = y - y mean') 
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8 MATLAB Code for the Sample Mean algorithm  
 
%Cleaning 
clear all 
close all 
clc 
%% 
% Author: Jiayi Su 
%% 
% Description: MATLAB Code for the First-Order system with constant control signal 
with constant-type intrusion signal using Sample Mean algorithm  
%% Systen matrices for the First-Order system 
A = 0.9; 
B = 1; 
C  = 2; 
D = 1; 
u = 1; % constant control signal u = 1 
F = 1; 
G = 1; 
  
kmax = 200;% Set up the time step kmax 
  
  
x= zeros(1,kmax);% Create an x vector of length kmax and fill it with 0s 
y = zeros(kmax,1);% Create an y vector of width kmax and fill it with 0s 
  
  
y_mean = NaN(kmax,1);% Create an y_mean vector of length kmax and fill it with 0s 
  
  
vd = 0.01;% Set up the covariance of the system state noise 
wd = 0.01;% Set up the covariance of the system measurement noise 
  
  
EIGENVALUE = eig(A)% Calculate the system eigenvalues 
%% Creating the noise for system state and measurement, which are distrubuted as 
Gaussian  
V=sqrt(vd)*randn(1,kmax); 
V1 = mean(V); 
V2 = V-V1; 
  
W=sqrt(wd)*randn(1,kmax); 
W1 = mean(W); 
W2 = W-W1; 
  
x(1) = 2;% Set up the system initial state 
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shiftpoint = 100;% Set up the shiftpoint where the intrusion signal enters the system 
  
syms i 
%Sasmple Mean scheme 
for k = 1:kmax 
     
     x(k+1) = A*x(k) + B*u + F*V2(k); 
     d = 2;% set up the constant-tyoe intrusion signal 
     % calculating the sample mean value of the system state and system measurement  
     y_mean(k) = C*(A^k)*x(1) + C*symsum(A^(k-i-1)*B*u, 0,k-1); 
      
    if k<= shiftpoint 
        
        y(k) = C*x(:,k)+G*W2(k);  
                 
        % Comparision between the ture measurement and the sample mean 
        % measurement 
        ytilde(k) = y(k) - y_mean(k); 
                
    else 
        % intrusion signal enters the system 
        y(k) = d + G*W2(k);  
        % Comparision between the ture measurement and the sample mean 
        % measurement         
        ytilde(k) = y(k) - y_mean(k); 
         
    end 
end 
  
  
% Plot of results 
figure, 
subplot(2,1,1)% system state 
plot(x) 
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('System State x') 
legend('x') 
subplot(2,1,2)% system measurement 
plot(y) 
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('System Measurement y') 
legend('y') 
  
  
figure,% sample mean value of the system measurement 
plot(y_mean) 
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xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('y mean') 
legend('y mean') 
  
figure, % residule between the system ture measurement and the system sample mean 
measurement 
plot(ytilde) 
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('y mean') 
legend('y tilde = y - y mean') 
 
 
